Social Foundation of Nash Bargaining Solution

该奖项资助经济理论方面的研究。其目标是为纳什议价解决方案建立一个新的基础，这是一个关于议价过程可能结果的基本科学见解。这个概念最初是使用公理方法开发的。后来的博弈论研究表明，如果交易双方通过其他提议进行谈判，非合作战略行为也会预测到同样的结果。然而，讨价还价发生在许多不同的情况下，纳什解决方案是否是其他情况下战略讨价还价的预测结果是一个悬而未决的问题。PI和他的研究团队正在开发一种新方法，为纳什议价解决方案建立一个分散的战略基础，该解决方案将适用于许多不同的可能的议价方法或协议。关键的观点是，讨价还价的过程是内生的，而不是事先假定的。该研究解决了一些基本问题，即维持纳什议价方案作为均衡稳定状态的社会动态。这将使他们能够评估解决方案概念对于替代经济模型的可行性。更广泛的影响包括在广泛的社会科学中使用这种新模型和方法，这些社会科学使用博弈论来发展关于讨价还价结果的假设。

This award funds research in economic theory. The goal is to develop a new foundation for the Nash bargaining solution, a basic scientific insight about the likely outcome of bargaining processes. This concept was originally developed using an axiomatic approach. Later research in game theory demonstrated that this same outcome was predicted by non-cooperative strategic behavior if the two parties to a bargain were negotiating through alternative offers. However, bargaining happens in many different contexts, and whether or not the Nash solution is the predicted outcome of strategic bargaining in other contexts is an unanswered question.The PI and his research team are developing a new method to build a decentralized strategic foundation for the Nash bargaining solution that will apply to many different possible bargaining methods or protocols. The key idea is that the bargaining process emerges endogenously, rather than being assumed ex ante. The research addresses fundamental questions about the kind of social dynamics that will sustain the Nash bargaining solution as an equilibrium steady state. This will allow them to assess how plausible the solution concept is for alternative models of the economy.Broader impacts include the possible use of this new model and methods in a wide range of social sciences that use game theory to develop hypotheses about bargaining outcomes.