Doctoral Dissertation Research: Assessing Judicial Power in Political Transitions

埃及和突尼斯2011年开始的过渡对两国法院的地位产生了几乎相反的影响。埃及经历了艰难的过渡，该国的法院，特别是最高宪法法院(SCC)的地位上升到了新的水平。相比之下，被认为是阿拉伯之春最稳定的突尼斯过渡政权在过渡期间暂停了宪法委员会。法院的地位对过渡政权内的权力分配具有重要影响。在埃及，权力在最高法院和几个选举产生的立法、行政和制宪机构之间分配。在突尼斯，权力集中在不受司法审查制约的单一立法制宪会议中。这项研究的重点是司法权的起源，但也会触及民主化问题。埃及和突尼斯的案件挑战了强大的法院和民主化总是齐头并进的观点。埃及司法机构的更大权力没有阻止埃及过渡在7月3日的政变中崩溃，突尼斯缺乏宪法审查也没有导致国民议会的独裁。由独立的司法机构维护的法治是任何巩固的民主制度的重要组成部分。然而，先前的研究没有充分解决司法机构如何协助民主进程或哪些形式的司法权力有助于民主过渡背景下的民主化的问题。该项目评估了三种可供选择的假说，以解释埃及和突尼斯的不同结果。这些假设涉及每个国家多数主义和反多数主义机构和利益的作用；宪法法院的不同体制结构，这可能为民间社会和法院之间的互动创造不同的机会；以及宪法法院和普通司法机构之间的不同关系。埃及和突尼斯的档案工作和采访将对这些解释进行评估。

The transitions that began in 2011 in Egypt and Tunisia have had nearly opposite effects on the status of courts in the two countries. Egypt's troubled transition has seen the country's courts, especially the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), rise to new levels of prominence. In contrast, the Tunisian transitional regime - considered the most stable of the Arab Spring - suspended the Constitutional Council for the duration of the transition. The status of the courts has important implications for the distribution of power within the transitional regime. In Egypt, power was divided between the SCC and several elected legislative, executive and constituent institutions. In Tunisia, power was concentrated in a single legislative-constituent Assembly unchecked by judicial review. The focus of this study is on the origins of judicial power, but it will also touch on the problem of democratization. The Egyptian and Tunisian cases are a challenge to the view that strong courts and democratization always go hand in hand. The greater power of the Egyptian judiciary did not prevent the Egyptian transition from collapsing in the July 3 coup, and the absence of constitutional review in Tunisia did not result in a dictatorship of the National Assembly. The rule of law upheld by an independent judiciary is an essential part of any consolidated democracy. Nevertheless, prior research has not adequately addressed the question of how the judiciary aids the democratic process or which forms of judicial power are conducive to democratization in the context of democratic transitions. This project assesses three alternative hypotheses to explain the divergent outcomes in Egypt and Tunisia. These hypotheses address the role of majoritarian and counter-majoritarian institutions and interests in each country; the different institutional structures of the constitutional court, which may create different opportunities for interaction between civil society and the courts; and the different relationships between the constitutional court and the ordinary judiciary. Archival work and interviews in Egypt and Tunisia will assess these explanations.