Bargaining in Bilateral Oligopolies with Application to the Health Sector

在医院部门，价格通常由医院和保险公司谈判，而不是由一方确定或通过拍卖确定。公司获得更好的谈判地位的一种方法是通过横向合并，这一建议为上述双边寡头垄断的竞争建立了理论和经验模型。然后，该建议显示了如何使用这些模型，以更好地了解在医疗保健部门的竞争的性质，以及检查反事实合并和政策补救措施在这个部门的影响。这种方法也有助于评估其他行业的兼并和竞争的影响，在这些行业中，价格是由不同的卖方和少数看门人买方之间的谈判决定的。此外，该建议进一步发展了双边寡头垄断谈判模型的理论基础。 这个拟议的项目有两个重要的知识价值。首先，它有助于谈判模型的实证文献，通过开发新的方法来分析竞争的部门与市场双方的公司数量少，并使用的方法来评估合并和其他反事实政策的影响。这项研究扩展了标准的应用建模框架合并的设置，价格是通过双边谈判确定。这些方法被应用到医疗保健行业，证明其适用性和使用中的一个重要的经验设置。第二，该项目有助于多个代理之间的讨价还价的理论文献，通过评估条件下，简单的解决方案可以产生的唯一平衡的同时交替提供游戏。因此，本项目为何时使用这些解决方案提供了指导。在许多重要的经济部门，价格是由不同当事方之间的谈判决定的，而不是由市场的一方单方面确定的。从政策角度看，了解这些部门的竞争和合并的影响十分重要。本建议发展了实证和理论方法来研究这些行业。在过去的25年里，医院行业一直是反垄断审判的对象，而该提案专门针对该行业的模式。因此，这一建议有能力影响反垄断政策，更广泛地说，我们对谈判价格行业竞争性质的理解。

In the hospital sector, prices are generally negotiated by hospitals and insurers rather than set by one side or determined by means of an auction. One of the ways that firms may achieve a better bargaining position is through a horizontal merger.This proposal develops theoretical and empirical models of competition for bilateral oligopolies such as the one described above. The proposal then shows how to use these models to better understand the nature of competition in the health care sector, as well as to examine the impact of counterfactual mergers and policy remedies in this sector. The approach is also useful to evaluate the impact of mergers and competition in other industries where prices are determined by negotiation between differentiated sellers and a small numbers of gatekeeper buyers. In addition, the proposal further develops the theoretical underpinnings for bilateral oligopoly bargaining models. This proposed project has two significant intellectual merits. First, it contributes to the empirical literature on bargaining models, by developing new methods to analyze competition in sectors with small numbers of firms on both sides of the market and using the methods to evaluate the impact of mergers and other counterfactual policies. The research extends the standard applied modeling framework for mergers to settings where prices are determined through bilateral negotiation. The methods are applied to the health care industry, demonstrating their applicability and use in an important empirical setting. Second, the proposed project contributes to the theoretical literature on bargaining between multiple agents by evaluating conditions under which simple solutions can be generated as the unique equilibrium of a simultaneous alternating offers game. Thus, this project provides guidance on when the use of these solutions is appropriate.In many important sectors of the economy, prices are determined by negotiation between different parties rather than by being set unilaterally by one side of the market. Understanding the impact of competition and mergers in these sectors is important from a policy perspective. This proposal develops empirical and theoretical methodology to examine these industries. The hospital industry has been the subject of more antitrust trials than any other sector over the past 25 years, and the proposal specializes in models for this sector. Thus, this proposal has the ability to influence antitrust policy and more broadly, our understanding of the nature of competition in industries with negotiated prices.