Planning IUCRC at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign: Center for Infrastructure Trustworthiness in Energy Systems (CITES)

也许比任何其他关键基础设施更重要的是，今天的电力输送系统对国家和公民的福祉至关重要。从农业、交通运输、制造业到电信，所有其他系统都依赖于安全、可靠的电力输送。有缺陷的系统，如1965年美国东北部的故障，环境因素，如2003年的美国东北部故障，物理攻击，如2013年加州北部的停电，或网络攻击，如2015年的乌克兰袭击，所有这些都导致了这种相互依赖的人类痛苦和生产力损失。能源系统基础设施可信中心(CITES)将通过提供以下能力使我国能够限制这些网络物理攻击对国家安全的影响：寻求防止此类攻击，快速检测发生的攻击，使强大的基础设施能够在存在此类攻击的情况下继续运行，并在攻击后快速恢复国家基础设施。从历史上看，随着控制能源输送系统(EDS)的系统变得更加复杂，其组件变得越来越相互连接。原本打算用于封闭、串行系统的系统暴露在对抗性环境中，没有最先进的网络安全设计；仅仅连接到这样的服务通常就足以对它们所监督的过程施加完全控制。虽然现代的EDS设计充分意识到了这些局限性，但在进行了大量的学术研究和行业基础设施投资后，此类系统的遗留问题仍然存在。CITES试图通过一种独特的学术和行业伙伴关系来解决这些遗留问题，其目的是：(I)确保遗留系统和供应商继续从有关网络安全以及其他领域的故障和改进的新兴科学中学习；(Ii)解决对关键的电子数据系统基础设施构成的威胁的独特性质。这些双重目标需要紧密结合的研究和行业合作伙伴关系，以不仅解决目前存在的问题，而且确保我国EDS基础设施的持续可靠性。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优势和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

Perhaps more than any other piece of critical infrastructure, today's power delivery systems are critical to the welfare of the country and its citizens. All other systems, from agriculture, transportation, and manufacturing to telecommunications are dependent on safe, reliable delivery of power. Faulty systems, as in the case of the northeastern US failures of 1965, environmental factors, as in the northeastern US failures of 2003, physical attacks, as in the 2013 northern California outages, or cyber attacks, as in the 2015 attacks in Ukraine, have all led to human suffering and loss of productivity as the result of this interdependence. The Center for Infrastructure Trustworthiness in Energy Systems (CITES) IUCRC will enable our nation to limit impact of these cyber-physical attacks on national security by providing capabilities that: seek to prevent such attacks, rapidly detect attacks that do occur, enable robust infrastructure that continues to operate in the presence of such attacks, and quickly restore the nation's infrastructure after attack.Historically, as the systems that controlled energy delivery systems (EDS) became more complex, their components became increasingly interconnected. Systems originally intended for closed, serial systems were exposed to adversarial environments without state-of-the-art designs for cybersecurity; merely connecting to such services was often enough to exert complete control over the processes they oversee. While the modern EDS designs are fully aware of these limitations, after substantial academic research and industry infrastructure investment, the legacy of such systems persists. CITES seeks to address these legacy implications through a unique academic and industry partnership aimed at: (i) ensuring that legacy systems and providers continue to learn from the nascent science of cybersecurity and failures and improvements in other domains; and (ii) addressing the unique nature of threats to the critical EDS infrastructure. These dual goals require tightly integrated research and industry partnerships to solve not only the problems as they exist today, but to insure the continued reliability of our nation's EDS infrastructure.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.