Understanding the Social Network Premium in Hiring Low Wage Workers

这个项目使用实验方法来研究一个人的社会联系如何影响这个人获得就业的可能性。该项目是与几个大型建筑工地合作进行的，旨在揭示社会联系较少的人往往更难找到工作的原因。该项目侧重于测试几个潜在的渠道，这些渠道被认为是造成这种差异的重要因素：(i)社会联系较少的员工很难向雇主表明自己的能力，（ii）雇主可能更愿意与他们已经有社会联系的员工一起度过工作日，（iii）雇主可能更有能力从长远来看让有社会联系的员工负责，（iv）雇主可能更愿意为他们有联系的员工提供就业的好处，或者(v)社会联系实际上是潜在生产力的准确预测指标。该项目的成果将为促进平等就业机会和提高劳动力市场效率的政策提供投入。这将改善劳动力配置，提高劳动生产率，促进经济增长。人们提出了五个假设来解释为什么雇主会从他们的社交网络中招聘员工，以及这如何影响群体生产力：(1)向雇主发出信号的能力；（ii）雇主对其网络中的人的偏好，（iii）问责制和更好的监督，（iv）个人喜好，以及(v)社会网络可能是工人生产力的一个指标。本研究通过改变雇主对员工生产力的信息、与员工生产力相关的财务激励以及雇主对员工的监控能力的程度来测试这些潜在的机制。该研究测量了治疗前、治疗期间和治疗后工人的生产率。pi将构建一个度量生产率的方法，该方法捕获有关工人每天完成的任务的详细信息。最后，pi将跟踪员工一段时间，看看员工的雇佣模式是如何根据他们在实验阶段受到的待遇而变化的。综合起来，这些信息使得pi能够解开这些渠道中哪一个解释了就业率的横截面变化。该项目的成果将为促进平等就业机会、提高劳动力市场效率、改善劳动力分配、提高劳动生产率和促进经济增长的政策提供投入。该奖项反映了美国国家科学基金会的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

This project uses experimental methods to study how an individual’s social connectedness affects the likelihood of that person securing employment. The project is conducted in partnership with several large construction worksites and seeks to unpack the reasons why less socially connected individuals tend to have a harder time finding work. The project focuses on testing several potential channels that have been proposed as important drivers of this difference: (i) less socially connected workers have a harder time signaling their ability to employers, (ii) employers may prefer to spend the workday with employees for whom they have a social connection already, (iii) employers may be better able to hold socially connected workers accountable in the long run, (iv) employers may prefer to provide the benefits of employment to those they are connected to, or (v) social connectedness is actually an accurate predictor of underlying productivity. The results of this project will provide inputs into policies to promote equal access to employment and increase the efficiency of the labor market. This will improve labor allocation, labor productivity, and economic growth.Five hypotheses have been put forth to explain why employers hire from their social networks and how this affects group productivity: (i) signal ability to employers; (ii) employer preference for people in their network, (iii) accountability and better monitoring, (iv) personal favor, and (v) social network may be an indicator of worker productivity. This research tests each of these potential mechanisms by varying the information employers have about worker’s productivity, financial incentives associated with employee productivity, and the extent of monitoring capability employers have over employees. The research measures worker productivity before treatment and then again during and after the treatment. The PIs will construct a measure productivity that captures detailed information about the tasks completed by the worker each day. Finally, the PIs will track workers over time to see how hiring patterns change for workers depending on the treatment they received during the experimental phase. Combined, these pieces of information allow the PIs to disentangle which of these channels explains the cross-sectional variation in employment rates. The results of this project will provide inputs into policies to promote equal access to employment and increase the efficiency of the labor market, improve labor allocation, labor productivity, and economic growth.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.