Need-based Redistribution as a Social Contract

终生收入的分布表现出极大程度的随机性。再分配福利国家可以被描述为一种特殊类型的保险手段，它可以减少终生收入的差异。子项目D2“基于需求的再分配作为一种社会契约”从理论上以及通过实验室实验的方式分析了福利国家在由参与但公正的观察者做出生产性投资决策的背景下造成的经济激励效应。1。供资期间表明，在减少不平等和增加投资方面，基于需求的再分配是可持续的。基于这个结果，在2。资助期内，次被告将调查不同的基于需要的司法概念，这些概念是由风险偏好和群体认同的事前异质性所产生的。在异质性存在的情况下，公正的观察者的投资行为是如何变化的？基于需求的再分配的差异如何影响群体成员对分配结果的接受程度？公正的观察者会歧视具有不同特征的群体成员吗？

The distribution of lifetime incomes exhibits an enormous degree of stochasticity. The redistributing welfare state can be characterized as a special type of insurance device that reduces the variance of lifetime incomes. Subproject D2 "Need-based Redistribution as a Social Contract" analyses theoretically as well as by means of laboratory experiments the economic incentive effects caused by the welfare state in the context of productive investment decisions made by involved but impartial observers. The 1. funding period showed that need-based redistribution is sustainable in terms of reducing inequality and increasing investment. Based on this result, in the 2. funding period, D2 will investigate different conceptions of need-based justice, which arise from ex-ante heterogeneity with respect to risk preferences and group identity. How does the impartial observer’s investment behavior change in the presence of heterogeneity? How does differentiation of need-based redistribution influence the acceptance of the distribution outcome by the group members? Will the impartial observer discriminate against group members with different characteristics?