Credit Lending as Two-Level Game: Troika-Debtor Negotiations in the Eurozone

欧洲金融和债务危机导致国际货币基金组织（IMF）等国际金融机构、欧盟委员会和欧洲央行等超国家组织、私人和公共债权人以及一些欧洲危机国家之间出现了新的协调与合作模式。协调的重点是贷款计划的谈判，这些谈判将贷款的支付与遵守限制性计划条件联系起来。到目前为止，对于IMF在拉美债务危机、亚洲危机和东欧转型中对发展中国家和转型国家的贷款，债权国联盟和债务国之间的互动动态进行了研究。本项目旨在从债务国政府的角度分析在四个欧洲国家（希腊、葡萄牙、爱尔兰、塞浦路斯）实施贷款计划的过程。利用“两级博弈”方法，我们建立了一个模型来研究权力不对称形成的谈判中债务人的自由裁量权。

The European financial and debt crisis has led to new patterns of coordination and cooperation between international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), supranational organizations like the European Commission and the European Central Bank, private and public creditors and a number of European crisis countries. Coordination focuses on the negotiation of lending programs which tie the disbursement of loans to compliance with restrictive program conditionalities. So far, the dynamics of interaction between creditor coalition and debtor state have been studied for IMF lending to developmental and transformation countries in the Latin American debt crisis, the Asian crisis and the transformation of Eastern Europe. This project seeks to analyze the process of implementation of lending programs in four European countries (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus) from the viewpoint of the debtor government. Drawing on the “Two-Level Game” approach we develop a model to study the discretion of the debtor in a negotiation shaped by power asymmetry.