Whistle-blowing regulation: A uniform or tailored approach?

超过三分之一的公司欺诈行为是通过举报举报的：通常被称为告密。举报保护、法规和战略是零星的。虽然美国有全面的举报立法，但其他发达的资本市场，如澳大利亚、德国、英国和加拿大，采取的举报战略不太全面，法国和瑞典等国家对举报提供的立法支持非常有限（Wolfe等人，2012年）。鉴于所采用的战略多种多样，拟议的研究力求回答以下研究问题：各国是否需要对举报监管采取不同的法律的办法，还是采取一刀切的办法？本项目将调查在不同的公司治理制度（退出制度和申诉制度）中，旨在鼓励会计师决定举报或保持沉默的监管机制的影响。特别是，我们将考虑反报复保护和经济奖励对专业会计师保持沉默、内部举报（向其雇主）或外部举报（向相关政府机构）的意图的影响。对这些方面的每一个方面进行调查，将有助于深入了解会计师在他们可能发现的欺诈类型（财务报表欺诈）方面的独特作用。

Over one-third of corporate fraud is reported through tips: commonly referred to as whistle-blowing. Whistle-blowing protections, regulations and strategies are sporadic. While the United States has comprehensive whistle-blowing legislation, other well-developed capital markets such as Australia, Germany, the UK, and Canada have adopted less comprehensive whistle-blowing strategies and countries such as France and Sweden provide very limited legislative support for whistle-blowing (Wolfe et al., 2012). In light of the diverse strategies employed, the proposed study seeks to answer the following research question: Do countries need different legal approaches to whistle-blowing regulation or does a one size fits all approach work? This project will investigate the impact of regulatory mechanisms designed to encourage the decision to blow the whistle on the whistle-blowing or silence decision of accountants in different corporate governance systems (exit and voice systems). In particular, we will consider the impact of anti-retaliation protection and financial rewards on professional accountants intention to remain silent, to whistle-blow internally (to their employer), or externally (to the relevant government authority). Investigating each of these facets together will offer insight into the unique role of accountants in relation to the very type of fraud they are likely to discover, financial statement fraud.