How does the social network affect the openness of farming villages in developing countries

这项研究利用埃塞俄比亚农村地区的个人调查数据和独裁者游戏的结果，检验了个人贸易政策偏好的决定因素。我们发现，低利他主义与保护主义立场有关。此外，以分配给同村人和村外人的钱之间的差异衡量的开放性表明，分配给局外人和局内人的钱差异较大的人(即对社交网络外的人怀有敌意)可能会支持进口限制。然而，这种趋势在出口自由化方面并未出现。

This researh examines the determinants of individual trade policy preferences using individual-level survey data and results of the dictator game from rural Ethiopia. We find that low altruism are associated with protectionist stance. In addition, openness measured by the difference between money allocated to a person from the same village and a person outside the village shows that those whose difference between money allocated to outsiders and insiders is big (i.e. hostile to people outside the social network) are likely to support import restrictions. However, such tendency has not appeared for export liberalization.