The Everyday Picture of the World and Naive Realism

在日常生活中，我们理所当然地认为，人、桌子、石头等普通物体都具有某种可感知的属性，比如颜色和形状。此外，我们认为这些普通的物体是独立于我们而存在的，它们在视觉经验中是可以直接接触到的，我们可以根据视觉经验证明我们对它们的信念是正确的。像这样的基本假设构成了一系列（显性或隐性）信念的核心，我们称之为（世界的）日常图景。这个项目将主题化两组这样的基本假设：一方面是本体论和形而上学的假设，另一方面是关于视觉体验的假设。我们将考察两种理论，它们试图公正地对待各自的假设：形而上学的朴素实在论和经验的朴素实在论。我们将看到，形而上学的朴素实在论虽然确实成功地描述了日常图景的本体论和形而上学假设，但很快就会发现它面临着局限性，因为——与在哲学界广泛传播的一种观点相反——它无法在自然科学研究的当前状态的背景下进行阐述。然而，我们计划检验一个朴素现实的本体论/形而上学的至少元素是否可能被证明是与自然科学的发展相容的。另一方面，经验朴素实在论会受到批评，因为它不能捕捉到我们在日常生活中所做的关于视觉体验的一些最基本的假设。因此，即使在世界的日常图景所设定的限制范围内，它也被证明是不够的。另一种视觉经验理论将被发展出来，它捕捉了我们对视觉经验的日常假设，从而结合了经验朴素实在论的一些元素。因此，整个项目分为两个子项目：(a)世界的日常图景和形而上学的朴素实在论(b)世界的日常图景和经验的朴素实在论

In everyday life, we take for granted that there are ordinary objects like persons, tables, and stones with certain perceivable properties like color and form. Moreover, we think that these ordinary objects exist independently of us, that they are immediately accessible in visual experience, and that we can justify our beliefs about them on the basis of visual experience. Fundamental assumptions like these form the core of the set of (explicit or implicit) beliefs we will call the everyday picture (of the world).This project will thematize two sets of such fundamental assumptions: ontological and metaphysical assumptions on the one hand and assumptions about visual experience on the other hand. Two theories will be examined that try to do justice to the respective assumptions: metaphysical naive realism and experiential naive realism. It will be shown that metaphysical naive realism, while indeed successful in describing the ontological and metaphysical assumptions of the everyday picture, can soon be seen confronting its limits, since - in opposition to an opinion spread widely in the philosophical community - it cannot be expounded against the background of the current state of research in the natural sciences. However, we plan to examine whether at least elements of a naive-realistic ontology/metaphysics might turn out to be compatible with the development of natural science.Experiential naive realism, on the other hand, will be criticized because it cannot capture some of the most fundamental assumptions about visual experience we make in everyday life. It, consequently, turns out to be inadequate even within the constraints set by the everyday picture of the world. An alternative theory of visual experience will be developed that captures our everyday assumptions about visual experience and thereby incorporates some elements of experiential naive realism. The project as a whole is thus divided into two sub-projects: (a) Everyday Picture of the World and Metaphysical Naive Realism (b) Everyday Picture of the World and Experiential Naive Realism