School Choice with Crowding Education Resources: Theory and Experiments
School Choice with Crowding Education Resources: Theory and Experiments
批准号:
22K13364
负责人:
ZHOU YU
金额:
$2.66万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
日本
项目类别:
Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
财政年份:
2022
资助国家:
日本
项目状态:
未结题
起止时间:
2022-04-01 至 2025-03-31
中文摘要
第一个研究成果是发表了一篇期刊论文和一篇工作论文。我与Serizawa Shigehiro Serizawa合作的论文《超越准线性的多对象拍卖设计:领先范例》发表在《游戏与经济行为》杂志上。我还与William Phan和Ryan Tierney联合发表了一篇工作论文《学校选择中的拥挤》。本论文是该项目的主要成果之一。我在社会选择与福利学会2022年会议上提交了这篇论文。我访问了东南大学、南京、中国、荷兰马斯特里赫特大学、荷兰蒂尔堡大学和法国巴黎经济学院,与那里的研究人员讨论了我的最新工作。
英文摘要
The first research achievement is that I published one journal paper and one working paper. My paper “Multi-object Auction Design beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples” joint with Shigehiro Serizawa is published at Games and Economic Behaviors.I also published a working paper “Crowding in School Choice”, joint with William Phan and Ryan Tierney. This paper is one of the main results of this project. I presented this paper at the 2022 Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare. I visited Southeast University, Nanjing, China, Maastricht University, the Netherlands, Tilburg University, the Netherlands, and Paris School of Economics, France, to discuss with researchers there about my latest work.
期刊论文(4)
专著(0)
科研奖励(0)
会议论文
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2022
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Abe Takaaki, Nakada Satoshi, Takaaki Abe, Takaaki Abe, Takaaki Abe, Yu Zhou; Shigehiro Serizawa, Yu Zhou]
通讯作者:
Yu Zhou
Multi-object Auction Design beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading E xamples .
超越准线性的多对象拍卖设计:领先示例。
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2022
期刊:
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Yu Zhou]
通讯作者:
Yu Zhou
Theory and Experiment of Efficient Multi-item Auctions with Financial Constraints
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批准号:19K13653
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项目类别:Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
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资助金额:$2.58万
-
财政年份:2019
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负责人:ZHOU YU
-
依托单位:
Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Auction Design Beyond Quasi-Linearity: Theory and Experiment
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批准号:17H06828
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项目类别:Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
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资助金额:$1.75万
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财政年份:2017
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负责人:ZHOU YU
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依托单位:
海外基金