The Root of the Epistemological Problem of the Connection of the Rational Principle to the External World in the Rationalists of the Early Modern Period - Descartes, Leibniz and Du Châtelet

在我的研究项目中，我希望调查基于理性原则的知识基础中出现的问题的根源。这个问题在康德那里就显露出来了，即如何把感性的内容与构成知识的内在原则一起加以思考的问题。然而，问题的真正根源在于近代早期的理性主义者，即笛卡尔和莱布尼茨。如果不容置疑的知识是建立在一种普遍的内在原则之上，而与感性分离，那么就必然产生一个问题，即感性的内容如何进入到知识的原则中去，这是理性主义者自己所提出的问题。换句话说，建立在理性原则基础上的知识如何作为外部世界的知识或依赖于外部世界的客体的知识。这个问题是不稳定的，因为它同时使理性主义的出发点受到质疑；即建立在一个普遍的内在原则之上的知识。我的研究项目是通过介绍一位哲学家Émilie du chtelet来揭示这个问题，直到现在，他一直被忽视，正是在这个背景下。与笛卡尔和莱布尼茨一样，她也在理性原则上建立知识，但她同时强调经验知识对科学和哲学的价值。她的时间概念超越了她自己的理性原则，建立在对理性理念的反思之上，这种理念考虑了我们通过感性对外部世界的认识。因此，杜夏·<e:2>特莱的时间概念为这个项目提供了出发点，通过拽拽近代早期理性主义者的理性原则与外部世界的联系问题的根源。我提出的研究在今天特别有趣，因为这个问题从未得到完全解决，我声称在杜夏·特莱特身上找到了一个关键，可以在不依赖于经验前提的情况下启动解决问题的方法。

In my research project I wish to investigate the root of a problem that arose in the foundation of knowledge based on a rational principle. The problem comes to light in Kant, i.e. in the question of how the content of sensibility is to be thought together with an internal principle which founds knowledge. Yet the actual root of the problem lies in the rationalists of the Early Modern Era, namely in Descartes and Leibniz. If indubitable knowledge is to be founded on a universal inner principle, in separation from sensibility, the question necessarily then arises (which the rationalists themselves pose) as to how the content of sensibility is to enter into the principle of knowledge. In other words: how is knowledge founded on a rational principle to serve as knowledge of an exterior world or of an object dependent on that world. The problem is precarious, insofar as it simultaneously puts the rationalistic point of departure into question; namely of founding knowledge on a general inner principle. My research project is to cast new light on the problem by introducing a philosopher, Émilie du Châtelet, who has until now been neglected in precisely this context. As with Descartes and Leibniz, she also founds knowledge on a rational principle, yet she simultaneously emphasises the value of experiential knowledge for science and philosophy. With her concept of time she goes beyond her own rational principle and founds it on a reflection of its idea, which takes into account our knowledge of the exterior world through sensibility. Du Châtelet’s concept of time therefore provides the point of departure for this project, by tugging at the root of the problem of the connection between the rational principle and the exterior world in the rationalists of the Early Modern Era. My proposed research is of particular interest today since the problem was never fully solved, and I purport to have found in Du Châtelet a key to initiating a solution to the problem without falling back on an empirical premise.