The Structure of Fundamentality

一个永恒的问题是，为了获得每一个事实，是否每一个事实都需要它所依赖的基础，或者是否也有基本事实，这些基本事实奠定了其他事实的基础，而不是依赖于任何基础本身。因此，基础性的概念自古以来就在形而上学中发挥着核心作用，并在当代的辩论中仍然发挥着举足轻重的作用(它也在形而上学以外的哲学领域中占有突出地位)。本研究项目考察了对基础性概念的研究方法，该概念使用了一个在最近的形而上学辩论中引起极大关注的概念：形而上学基础的概念，被理解为一种生产性的优先关系，一些事实因其他事实而获得，即它们的基础。在基础理论方法中，基本性的概念可以给出一个简单的定义：一个事实是根本的，当且仅当它不以任何进一步的事实为基础。但除了这一基本定义外，该框架还允许对其进行更复杂的变体。该研究项目有三个目的：(I)加深我们对基础性的基础理论方法的理解，并将其与竞争对手的方法进行比较。(Ii)针对最近文献中提出的反对意见，为基础性的基础理论方法辩护。(Iii)最重要的是，发展更复杂的方法，从基础的角度定义基础性，从而允许有洞察力的区别和应用，而简单的定义是盲目的。关于该项目的第三个核心目标，我们将特别探讨两个主题：(A)某些事实可能部分是基本的，但不完全是基本的(例如，这对于关于出现的辩论是重要的)。为了给这一想法腾出空间，我们提出了一种新的解释，即部分基础的概念，一些事实部分地基于其他事实，而缺乏完整的基础。这样的事实可以被认为是部分基本的。我们将在一个严格的正式框架中发展这一概念，并展示其在现有辩论中的丰硕成果。(B)Kit Fine的观点，即可以存在两种不以其他事实为基础的事实：一方面，是简单地没有基础的事实(例如，关于物质在空间中分布的残酷事实)；另一方面，直觉上可以被算作基础的事实，尽管不是基于任何进一步的事实(例如，某些逻辑定律)。这种区别导致了两种迄今未被注意到的原教旨性之间的对应区别。

It is a perennial question whether, in order to obtain, every fact needs a fundament on which it rests, or whether there are also fundamental facts, which lay the basis for other facts while not resting on any fundament themselves. Accordingly, the notion of fundamentality has played a central role in metaphysics from ancient times onwards and still plays a pivotal role in the contemporary debate (it also figures prominently in philosophical areas other than metaphysics).This research project examines approaches to the idea of fundamentality that employ a notion which has garnered significant attention in recent debates in metaphysics: the notion of metaphysical grounding, understood as a productive priority relation in virtue of which some facts obtain because of others, i.e. their grounds. Within a ground-theoretical approach, the notion of fundamentality can be given a straightforward definition: A fact is fundamental if and only if it is not grounded in any further facts. But apart from this basic definition, the framework allows for more sophisticated variants of it. The research project has three aims:(i) To deepen our understanding of the ground-theoretical approach to fundamentality, and compare the approach with rival ones.(ii) To defend the ground-theoretical approach to fundamentality against objections raised in recent literature.(iii) Most importantly, to develop more sophisticated ways of defining fundamentality in terms of grounding, thus allowing for insightful distinctions and applications to which the simple definition is blind. As to this third, central aim of the project, we will in particular explore two themes:(A) The idea that some facts may be partially fundamental while not being fully fundamental (which is important, for instance, for the debate about emergence). In order to make room for this idea, we develop a novel account of the notion of a partial ground, on which some facts are partially grounded in other facts while lacking a full ground. Such facts can then be regarded as partially fundamental. We will develop this idea in a rigorous formal framework and demonstrate its fruitfulness for existing debates.(B) Kit Fine’s idea that there can be two sorts of facts that are not grounded in other facts: on the one hand, facts which are simply ungrounded (e.g. brute facts about the distribution of matter in space); on the other, facts which intuitively can count as grounded, though not grounded in any further facts (e.g. certain logical laws). This distinction gives rise to a corresponding one between two sorts of fundamentality which has hitherto gone unnoticed.