Rethinking reality's structure: An investigation of fundamentality and a defence of interdependence

我的论文将批判形而上学的基础主义，发展一个连贯的替代。基础主义认为，现实的基础是最小的可能对象：根本的是不能进一步分割的东西。基础主义主导了西方形而上学的探索。我将探讨它的文化偶然性，运用印度哲学的洞察力，发展一种对西方形而上学具有深远影响的根本性的新解释。传统佛教哲学认为“相互依存”是根本性的，优先考虑关系而不是对象。龙树对形而上学的空性的论证发展了这样一幅图景，现实是一个整合的网络，在这个网络中，基本部分是不能分离的。在由此产生的模型中，要么集成网络作为一个整体必须是基本的（一元论），要么集成网络是独立的，而不需要一个基本的层次（凝聚论）。我的项目涉及发展一个帐户的coherentist相互依存，借鉴西方和印度的哲学传统，定位和联合收割机最成功的论点：a。形而上学依赖关系的存在。当我们说（例如）“整体取决于它的部分”，我们似乎援引了一种“因为”关系而存在-一种形而上学的依赖关系。在发展Schaffer（2010）的工作的基础上，我认为这种关系对于任何成功的现实结构模型都是必不可少的。双向方向依赖关系的可能性。传统观点认为，依赖性是不对称的：如果x依赖于y，y就不依赖于x。Thompson（2018）最近的工作削弱了这一主张，为对称的依赖关系创造了空间。我将发展汤普森的工作，不仅表明我们有双向关系的空间，而且表明我们应该保持一致。缺乏基本的水平。我将考虑布利斯（2015）和塔兰特（2017）的工作，他们认为无限回归的痛苦，一些实体必须是根本的。我将从佛教传统中探索资源，以帮助规避这类论点，以捍卫一个连贯的图片对它的一元论对手。我提出的论文直接建立在我的硕士论文相互依存一元论和连贯性（区别）。我在亚洲哲学、佛教形而上学和形而上学的本科模块中取得了第一名。我将在2020年春季成为亚洲哲学模块的教学成员。诺丁汉的哲学系是这个项目的理想基地。我将从塔兰特教授在依赖性和基本性方面的专业知识以及巴克博士对印度形而上学的兴趣中受益匪浅。

My thesis will critique metaphysical foundationalism, developing a coherentist alternative. Foundationalism is the view that the foundations of reality are the smallest possible objects: what is fundamental is what cannot be divided further. Foundationalism has dominated Western metaphysical enquiry. I will explore its cultural contingency, using insight from Indian philosophy to develop a novel account of fundamentality with far-reaching consequences for Western metaphysics.Traditional Buddhist philosophy takes 'interdependence' to be fundamental, prioritizing relations over objects. Nagarjuna's argument for metaphysical emptiness develops such a picture, where reality is an integrated network within which fundamental parts cannot be separated. On the resulting model, either the integrated network as a whole must be fundamental (monism), or the integrated network is self-dependent, without the need for a fundamental level (coherentism). My project involves developing an account of coherentist interdependence, drawing upon Western and Indian Philosophical traditions to locate and combine the most successful arguments for:a. The existence of a metaphysical dependence relation. When we say (e.g.) that 'the whole depends upon its parts', we appear to invoke a kind of 'exists because of' relation-a metaphysical dependence relation. Developing work by Schaffer (2010), I'll argue that such a relation is essential to any successful model of the structure of reality.b. The possibility of a two-way directional dependence relation. The conventional view is that dependence is asymmetric: if x depends upon y, y does not depend upon x. Recent work by Thompson(2018) undermines this claim, making space for a symmetrical relation of dependence. I will develop Thompson's work, showing not only that we have space for a two-way relation, but that we should posit one.c. The absence of a fundamental level. I'll consider work by Bliss (2015) and Tallant (2017) that argues on pain of infinite regress, some entity must be fundamental. I'll explore resources from the Buddhist tradition to help circumvent arguments of this sort in order to defend a coherentist picture against its monistic rival.My proposed thesis builds directly upon my MA dissertation on interdependent monism and coherentism(Distinction). I achieved firsts in undergraduate modules in Asian philosophy, Buddhist metaphysics and Metametaphysics. I will be a teaching affiliate on a module in Asian philosophy in Spring 2020.Nottingham's Philosophy department is an ideal base for this project. I will greatly benefit from Professor Tallant's expertise in dependence and fundamentality, as well as Dr Barker's interest in Indianmetaphysics.