The interdisciplinary and philosophical justification of a philosophy of values

这个项目的目的是调查一个问题，即价值哲学是否可以被捍卫，而不是某些哲学和跨学科的批评。在最初的步骤中，将系统地重建各种价值概念，例如它们在特定科学话语中使用的概念，以便不仅评估它们对价值哲学的主张，而且评估可能对它们提出的批评点。在第二步中，将分析不同哲学传统对价值理论提出的一些反对意见。一些观点对我们的行为和决定可能在价值的非概念性经验的基础上被合理证明的想法持批评态度，因为这些几乎不容易受到理性话语的影响，另一些人则担心价值哲学的本体论承诺，将某种“柏拉图主义”或“唯心主义”归因于它。第三，该项目将在马克斯·舍勒和尼古拉·哈特曼分别介绍的一些基本见解和区别的背景下阐述自己的价值观哲学观点。最后一步将是调查这个问题，这个价值哲学，就像它在这个项目中暴露的那样，是否可以抵御上述哲学上的反对意见，如果它能够解释相关的科学价值概念。

The aim of this project is to investigate the question whether or not a philosophy of values may be defended as opposed to certain philosophical and interdisciplinary critiques. In an initial step, various concepts of value, such as they are employed within the discourses of specific sciences, will be reconstructed systematically in order to assess not only their claims to a philosophy of values, but also points of criticism that might be raised against them. In a second step, a number of objections that have been brought forward by different philosophical traditions against theories of value are to be analysed. While some views are critical of the idea that our actions and decisions might ever be reasonably justified on the basis of non-conceptual experiences of values, because these are barely susceptible to a rational discourse, others worry at the ontological commitments of a philosophy of value, ascribing some sort of ‘Platonism’ or ‘Idealism’ to it. Thirdly, the project will elaborate its own philosophical view on values against the background of certain fundamental insights and distinctions introduced by Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann, respectively. The final step will consist in an inquiry into the question whether this philosophy of value, such as it is exposed in this project, can be defended against the above-mentioned philosophical objections and if it would be able to account for relevant scientific concepts of value.