Reconstruction of the categories of litigation/non-adversarial case

1960年，大法院大法官席就宪法程序保障与“审判权”相关的“公开对抗性裁决”做出了判决。最高法院的判决应该改变，理由如下。在大法院早期的判例中，非对抗性案件被“排除在正常的诉讼程序之外”，而目前的“审判权”是根据是否“纯粹对抗性（或诉讼性）”来决定的。有人批评这种推理。最近，家事诉讼领域的专家们认为，大法院对《家事法院法》中被归类为“大隅型”的非对抗性案件的推理是错误的，因为“民事诉讼无论在理论上还是在现实中，都不能确立实体法上的权利和义务。”此外，根据诉讼/非对抗性案件和裁决/节奏的类别，更多样化的程序可以分为以下几类：(a)诉讼等于裁决程序；(b)诉讼等同于临时程序；(c)非对抗性案件同样适用临时程序。1960年最高法院的判决只包括(a)和(c)类，似乎没有考虑到(b)类。但是，(b)类包括在民事诉讼和行政诉讼中都起重要作用的“临时命令”。由于判例理论只在例外情况下才要求口头辩论或单方面听证，因此(b)类通常从未从宪法的角度加以审查。因此，可能需要从宪法角度考虑(b)和(c)类。换句话说，如果将宪法第32条的“审判”概念解释为比第82条更广泛，那么第32条可以解释为包括“公开对抗性裁决”不包括的其他程序。少

In 1960, the Grand Bench of the Supreme Court made a judgment concerning constitutional procedural guarantees for conducting "public adversarial rulings" relating it to the "right to trial." This Supreme Court decision should be changed for the following reasons. In the early cases of the Supreme Court, non-adversarial cases were "withheld from normal litigation procedure," however, at present, a "right to trial" is decided on the grounds of whether or not "it is purely adversarial (or litigious)." There has been criticism concerning this reasoning. Recently, experts in the field of family court proceedings argue that the Supreme Court's reasoning fails in regard to non-adversarial cases categorized as "Otsu-type" within the Family Court Law since, "civil litigation, neither theoretically nor in reality, functions in dispute resolution to establish rights and obligations under substantive law."Furthermore, in terms of the categories of litigation/non-adversarial cases and rulings/tempo … More rary procedures, divisions can be made in the following categories : (a)litigation equals rulings procedure ; (b)litigation equals temporary procedures ; and (c)non-adversarial cases equal temporary procedures. The Grand Bench decision in 1960 only included the categories of (a) and (c) and did not seem to have (b) in mind. However, the category of (b) includes "temporary orders" which play a significant role in both civil litigation as well as administrative litigation. Since case theory orders oral arguments or ex parte hearings only in exceptional cases, the (b) category in general has never been examined from a constitutional perspective. Therefore, there may be a need to consider a constitutional perspective for the categories of (b) and (c). In other words, if the concept of "trial" in Article 32 of the Constitution is interpreted to be wider than that of Article 82, then Article 32 can be interpreted to include other formalities that are not included in "public adversarial rulings." Less