A theoretical study on compansation systems, endogenous timing of wage setting and their effects on economic welfare
A theoretical study on compansation systems, endogenous timing of wage setting and their effects on economic welfare
批准号:
16530122
负责人:
TAKAMI Hiroyuki
金额:
$1.79万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
日本
项目类别:
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份:
2004
资助国家:
日本
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2004 至 2006
中文摘要
本项目首先分析了一个利润分享企业和一个传统的非利润分享企业的经营权双头垄断模型中工资谈判的内生秩序。这些公司提前宣布了他们将与工会进行工资谈判的时间段,然后致力于他们的选择。一旦讨价还价决定了工资率,企业就会选择在双寡头市场上销售的同质产品的产出水平。只有斯塔克尔伯格均衡--利润分享公司首先参与工资谈判,传统的利润分享公司推迟谈判--才会内生出现。这一结果与日本春季攻势[顺藤]过程中观察到的顺序工资讨价还价是一致的。其次,本项目使用一个具有利润分享的工会双寡头模型和一个传统的非利润分享公司来分析顺序工资讨价还价对就业和工资的影响。结果表明,与同时变动相比,顺序工资讨价还价使利润分享企业的雇佣关系稳定,而使传统企业的雇佣关系不稳定。此外,对利润分享公司的积极冲击在顺序搬迁中比在同时搬迁中更多地减少了传统公司的就业。考虑到大型利润分享公司位于城市地区,而中小型传统公司位于农村地区,我们的结果与最近日本劳动力市场的经验是一致的。
英文摘要
This project firstly analyzes the endogenous order of wage bargaining in a right-to-manage duopoly model with a profit-sharing and a conventional non-profit-sharing firm. The firms announce the periods in which they will engage in wage bargaining with their unions in advance and are then committed to their choices. Once the wage rates are determined by the bargaining, the firms choose the output levels of homogenous products that are sold in the duopoly market. Only the Stackelberg equilibrium, with the profit-sharing firm engaging in wage bargaining first and the conventional r on-profit-sharing firm delaying it, emerges endogenously. This result is consistent with the sequential wage bargaining observed in the spring offensive [Shunto] process in Japan.This project secondly analyzes the effects of sequential wage bargaining on the employment and wages using a unionized duopoly model with a profit-sharing and a conventional non-profit-sharing firm. As a result, it is shown that the sequential wage bargaining makes the employment of the profit-sharing firm stable but that of the conventional firm volatile compared to the simultaneous move. Also, a positive shock to the profit-sharing firm decreases the conventional firm's employment more in the sequential move than in the simultaneous move. Taking into the fact into account that large profit-sharing firms are located in the urban regions while small and medium conventional firms are in the rural regions, our results are consistent with the recent Japanese labour market experiences.
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DOI:
--
发表时间:
2005
期刊:
大分大学経済論集 第57巻第3号
影响因子:
--
作者:
[高見博之(第一著者), 中村保, 高見博之]
通讯作者:
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DOI:
--
发表时间:
2005
期刊:
現代経済学研究 第12号
影响因子:
--
作者:
[高見博之(第一著者), 中村保]
通讯作者:
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DOI:
--
发表时间:
2005
期刊:
Oita University Economic Review Vol.57, No.3
影响因子:
--
作者:
[]
通讯作者:
Sequential Wage Bargaining and its Impacts on Local Labour Markets
连续工资谈判及其对当地劳动力市场的影响
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2007
期刊:
大分大学経済論集 第58巻第6号
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Takami, Hiroyuk (first author), Nakamura, Tamotsu]
通讯作者:
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Wage Bargainig and the Endogenous Schtackelberg Equilibria
工资谈判和内生施塔克尔伯格均衡
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2005
期刊:
Studies in Contemporary Economics No.12
影响因子:
--
作者:
[]
通讯作者:
Theoretical research of endogenous timing and economic welfare
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批准号:20530245
-
项目类别:Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
-
资助金额:$2.91万
-
财政年份:2008
-
负责人:TAKAMI Hiroyuki
-
依托单位:
海外基金