Information Frictions, Central Bank Communication, and Monetary Policy

经济状况，如自然产出水平和自然失业率，是不可观察的。中央银行，如欧洲中央银行（ECB）和美国联邦储备银行（Fed），拥有丰富的资源来监控经济活动。因此，他们可能对经济状况有更好的了解。在这个项目中，我们解决以下问题。央行是否应该披露有关经济状况的私人信息？中央银行和私人市场之间的信息不对称如何影响货币政策的传导？信息摩擦如何影响最优货币政策的设计？这些问题的答案在学术界是相关的，对政策制定者也很重要。拟议的研究项目包括三篇论文，旨在分别回答这些问题。传统观点认为，提高央行透明度是最佳选择。在第一篇论文中，我们提出了基于分散信念和名义刚性框架的最优中央银行沟通研究。我们认为，由于名义上的刚性，更多的透明度并不一定会改善福利。我们的模型可以量化央行沟通的福利损失/收益。一旦项目完成，我们将提供政策建议，看看美联储、英国央行或欧洲央行是否向市场发布了太多信息。在第二篇论文中，我们研究了在中央银行和私人市场之间信息不对称的模型中货币政策的效果。此外，我们还引入了歧义信号和反歧义代理。模棱两可的货币政策信号通道就是在这样的框架下出现的。在第三篇论文中，我们研究了一个具有分散信念、名义刚性和内生价格学习的模型中的最优货币政策。

Economic conditions, such as the natural level of output and the natural unemployment rate, are not observable. Central banks, e.g., the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal Reserve bank (Fed) in the United States, attribute abundant resources to monitor economic activities. Thus, they might have superior information regarding the state of the economy. In this project, we address the following questions. Should the central bank reveal its private information about economic conditions? How does asymmetric information between the central bank and private market affect the transmission of monetary policy? How do information frictions affect the design of optimal monetary policy? Answers to these questions are relevant within the academic circle and important for policymakers. The proposed research project consists of three papers that aim to answer these questions separately. The conventional wisdom views the increased central bank transparency as optimal. In the first paper, we propose to study the optimal central bank communication based on a framework with dispersed beliefs and nominal rigidity. We argue that more transparency does not necessarily improve welfare due to nominal rigidities. Our model allows quantifying the welfare loss/gain of central bank communication. Once the project is completed, we will provide a policy recommendation whether the Fed, the Bank of England, or the ECB have released too much information to the market. In the second paper, we study the effects of monetary policy in a model with asymmetric information between the central bank and the private market. Moreover, we introduce ambiguous signals and ambiguity-averse agents. The ambiguous signaling channel of monetary policy emerges in such a framework. In the third paper, we study the optimal monetary policy in a model with dispersed beliefs, nominal rigidity, and endogenous learning from price.