Arguing the Peace of Prague (1635) - a failed peace or a reference peace to the Westphalian peace congress?

到目前为止，早期近代史上的和平研究主要涉及威斯特伐利亚和平，一般认为这一中心和平协议是独立的和“自给自足的”事件。很少提到其他和平协定。最近的研究强调了它作为后来和平协议的参考和平的意义，但仍然没有将威斯特伐利亚和平置于与旧协议的连续性线上。这就是这个项目的起点，试图将和平知识、和平参考资料和建设和平进程的实践联系起来，这导致了以下有见地的问题：这些知识储备对谈判实践起到了什么作用？主人公指的是和平的哪些定义和知识？这如何才能转化为合理的行动选择呢？这种对和平的了解怎么会是建设和平，甚至阻碍和平呢？继承的和平传统知识，即经验和经验知识以及行动者的集体记忆有多重要？1635年的布拉格和平协议是三十年战争期间建设和平路线上的前一次事件，是焦点。今天，研究仍然认为布拉格和平协议是失败的，而威斯特伐利亚和平协议本身被视为成功的典范。我们的项目提出了这样一个问题：在1643年至1648年在明斯特和奥斯纳布吕克进行的威斯特伐利亚和平条约谈判期间，参与者对布拉格和平协议及其具体规定的了解起到了什么作用。布拉格和平协议甚至是威斯特伐利亚和平协议成功的重要前提吗？S？这严重质疑将布拉格和平协议归因于“失败”的说法。演员的交流和他们的论证路线起着重要的作用。因此，在威斯特伐利亚和平大会期间使用布拉格和平协定作为论据，正是这一项目的重点。特别是选举萨克森州和帝国代表团将被深入分析。一方面，作为布拉格和平协议的主要承包商，他们当然必须尽可能长时间地坚持《布拉格和平协议》--但另一方面，在威斯特伐利亚和平大会期间，鉴于布拉格被视为失败，他们几乎不能将其作为参考。鉴于这一星座，分析他们的谈判策略和论证路线将有助于找出1635年后，特别是在威斯特伐利亚和平大会期间，布拉格和平协议作为论点的意义。该项目不仅对早期的近代史和平研究做出了贡献，而且通过专注于和平知识并以一种时代的视角挑战今天S对失败的归因，从而对“失败”这一主题做出了贡献。

Early modern history peace research so far has primarily dealt with the Westphalian Peace and generally has seen this central peace agreement as independent and „self-contained“ event. Rarely references to other peace agreements were made. Lately research has emphasized its meaning as reference peace for later peace agreements, yet still without placing the Westphalian Peace in a line of continuity with older agreements. This is where this project starts, trying to link knowledge of peace, peace references, and the practice of peace-building processes, which leads to the following insightful questions: Which role do these stocks of knowledge play for the practices of negotiation? To which definitions and knowledge of peace refer the protagonists? How could this be translated into reasonable action options? How can this knowledge of peace be peace-building, or even peace-hindering? How important is the inhereted, traditional knowledge of peace, i.e. experience and empirical knowledge and the actors´ collective memory? The Prague peace agreement of 1635, the previous event in the line of peace-building during the Thirty Years War, is in the focus. Today research still considers the Prague peace agreement as failed whereas the Westphalian Peace itself is seen as a success model. Our project raises the question which role the actors´ knowledge about the Prague peace agreement and its specific regulations played during the negoations of the Westphalian Peace Treaty in Munster and Osnabruck between 1643 and 1648. Was the Prague peace agreement even an important pre-condition for the Westphalian Peace´s success? This seriously questions the attribution of the Prague peace agreement as „failed“. The actors´ communication and their line of argumentation play an important role. Thus, using the Prague peace agreement as an argument during the Westphalian Peace congress is in the very focus of this project. Especially, electoral Saxony and the Imperial delegation will be analyzed in depth. On the one hand side, as main contractors of the Prague peace agreement they certainly had to stick to the Peace of Prague as long as possible – yet on the other hand side, they hardly could use it as reference during the Westphalian peace congress given Prague counted as failure. Given this constellation, the analysis of their negotiation strategies and lines of argumentation will be useful to find out which meaning the Prague peace agreement had as an argument after 1635, especially during the Westphalian peace congress. The project contributes not only to Early modern history peace research but also to the topic „Failure“ by focussing on the knowledge of peace and by challenging today´s ascription of failure by taking a coeval perspective.