Modeling the relations between the incidence of within-firm corporate fraud and the quality of corporate governance structures.

在市场经济中运作的组织存在代理问题，因为公司的管理者很少是所有者。一个代价高昂的结果是组织内部欺诈的发生率。近年来，企业发展并完善了公司治理结构。迄今为止，关于公司治理对公司内部欺诈发生率的影响的分析很少。本研究的目的是建立和测试公司内部欺诈与公司治理系统之间关系的模型，该模型可以作为行业监测和管理风险的诊断工具。

Organisations operating in market economies have agency problems because the managers of the firm are rarely the owners. One costly outcome is the incidence of fraud within organisations. In recent times organisations have developed and refined corporate governance structures. To date there has been little analysis of the effect that corporate governance has on the incidence of with-in firm fraud. The aim of this research is to build and test a model of the relations between within-firm fraud and corporate governance systems that can be used as a diagnostic tool by industry to monitor and manage risk.