"A Dynamic Analysis of the Common Use of Network in Public Utility Industries"

该研究项目的目的是对电力、电信、天然气等公用事业行业中常用的网络设施进行经济分析。本研究项目的贡献体现在以下两篇论文中：1.《垂直分离与垂直整合：准入管制的进入威慑和降低成本激励》。本文考察了下游放松管制环境下的准入管制，并询问是否应该将垂直整合的现任者分拆。为了考虑这一问题，文中的模型以在位企业的进入威慑激励和对网络设施上的工艺创新的投资为特征。然后，首先分析表明，当接入费用较低(较高)时，一体化条件下在位人员的进入威慑激励通常比分离条件下的少(多)。其次，垂直分离的主要优点是提供了较低的公用事业产品价格，但其缺点是它不能激励现有企业投资于网络设施的工艺创新。此外，两种垂直制度之间的福利比较取决于公共基金影子成本的大小，这使得比较成为一个微妙的问题。2.放松管制与资本投资本文考察了公用事业公司在放松管制或引入竞争的情况下对资本投资的激励。在本文中，我们使用实物期权方法认为，放松管制会削弱企业的投资动机，因为它会通过进入威胁给企业带来不确定性。此外，本文还探讨了完善投资激励的政策对策。

The purpose of the research project is to provide an economic analysis of the common use of network facilities in public utility industries, like electricity, telecommunication, natural gas, etc. The contributions made by the research project are presented in the following two papers.1."Vertical Separation vs, Vertical Integration : Entry Deterrence and Cost- Reducing Incentives with Access Regulation"This paper examines access regulation under a deregurated downstream environment and asks whether a vertically integrated incumbent should be unbundled or not. To consider this issue, the model in the paper features an incumbent firm's entry-deterrence incentive and the investment for process innovation on a network facility. Then, the analysis firstly shows that the incumbent generally has less (more) entry-deterrence incentive under integration than under separation when an access charge is low (high). Secondly, the main merit of vertical separation is to provide a lower price of public-utility good, while its demerit is its weak power to induce an incumbent to invest for process innovation on network facility. Also, welfare comparison between the two vertical regimes depends on the magnitude of shadow cost of public funds, which makes the comparison a subtle issue.2."Deregulation and Capital Investment"This paper examines public-utility firms' incentives for capital investment with deregulation or the introduction of competition. In the paper, we claim by using real option approach that the deregulation makes the firms' incentives for investment weak, since it causes uncertainty to the firms through entry threat. Also, we discuss the policy remedies for the improvement of the investment incentives in the paper.