A Research on Infrastructure Penetration and Transition of Market Structure in Network Industries

本研究探讨管制与企业策略行为对网路产业基础设施渗透与市场结构之影响。我们得到两个主要的分析结果。首先，动态分析表明，普遍服务义务导致基础设施渗透的延迟，这反过来又意味着客户之间的不平等加剧。第二，基础设施所有者的战略投资行为会扭曲准入监管，也会导致过度使用旁路（即：例如，从福利的角度来看，不充分利用机会。

This research examines the effect of regulation and a firm's strategic behavior on infrastructure penetration and market structures in network industries. We obtain two main analytical results. First, a dynamic analysis shows that universal service obligation induces the delay of infrastructure penetration, which in turn implies the enhancement of inequality among customers. Second, the strategic investment behavior of an infrastructure owner can distort access regulation, and it also induces overuse of a bypass(i. e., underuse of access) from a welfare perspective.