A COMPARATIVE RESEARCH ON LOCKE'S AND BERKELEY'S LOGICAL SPACES OF IDEAS

我们通常从直接实在论的观点来对待各种经验对象，但是关于经验对象和我们对它们的感知，我们的头脑中开始形成一些“物理”怀疑。在洛克的例子中，作为解决这些问题的一种方式，事物本身是假设性的，它们只具有基于它们的主要性质和力量。在事物本身被设定的那一刻，事物的实在性就从经验对象转移到了事物本身，严格地说，继续称经验对象为“事物”就变得不合适了。因此，为了使论证精确，我们需要为经验对象及其属性取一个不同的名称。为此，洛克使用了“观念”一词。因此，当事物本身被置于它们之外时，经验对象及其属性，本来是外在的存在物，沿着其他内在存在物，被重新安置在心灵中，即在观念世界中。因此，洛克的观念理论的三项关系的自然主义框架，包括事物本身，观念和心灵，是框架。虽然贝克莱的唯心主义是依赖于洛克的观念理论的自然主义逻辑，它可以建立“扭曲”，在这个词的双重意义。第一，他的唯心主义结果是拒绝了它的前提;在这个意义上，它是矛盾的。其次，贝克莱不恰当地强调洛克唯物主义是矛盾的，不恰当地使用了与洛克观念论中的概念思维相一致的意象思维。因此，为了充分确定贝克莱唯心主义的逻辑，似乎有必要重新考虑这些基本问题。

We ordinarily treat various experiential objects from the direct realist point of view But concerning the experiential objects and our perception of them some 'physical' suspicions begin to form in our minds. And in Locke's case, as a way of, solving these problems, the things themselves are hypothetically posited, which merely have primary qualities and powers based on them. The moment things themselves are posited, the reality of things is transferred from experiential objects to the things themselves, and it becomes inappropriate, strictly speaking, to continue calling experiential objects 'things'. Therefore, in order to make the argument precise,, one needs a different name for experiential objects and their properties. For this purpose Locke uses the term 'idea'. Thus, when things themselves are posited beyond them, the experiential objects and their properties, which are originally external beings, are, along with other internal beings, relocated in the mind, namely, in the world of ideas. Thus, the three-term-relational, naturalistic framework of Locke's theory of ideas, comprised of things themselves, ideas and the mind, is framed.While Berkeley's idealism is dependent on the naturalistic logic of Locke's theory of ideas, it can be established by 'distortion', in the double sense of the word. First, his idealism rejects its premise as a result; in this sense it is contradictory. Second, Berkeley improperly, emphasizes that Lockian materialism is a contradiction, by making inappropriate use of imagist thinking, which is in harmony with conceptual thinking in Locke's theory of ideas. Thus, in order to determine the logic of Berkeley's idealism adequately, it appears necessary to reconsider those basic problems.