Economic analysis of the minimum auction price

本研究的主要目的是对民事执行制度中的一项制度--最低拍卖价格（MAP）--的经济效率进行评价。MAP是当今日本规制改革争论的热点问题之一。本文的研究结果可以概括为以下几点：第一，比较分析表明，日本民事执行原则中的清算原则、剩余价值原则并不是绝对必要的。特别是90年代末美国止赎改革的经验、争议和制度成果，给我们启示了真实的房地产清算的另一种可能性。其次，将公司金融理论应用于真实的房地产融资，我们发现MAP只是确定抵押品定价控制权的次优解。因此，拍卖博弈理论中关于有效保留价的正式指导原则不能直接应用于MAP。第三，通过对东京和大坂地方法院最近审理的1500多起司法拍卖案件的数据进行统计分析，发现抵押品拍卖中的竞争压力是避免MAP的不利影响的关键因素。

The main object of this research is to evaluate the economic efficiency of an institution in civil execution system, the Minimum Auction Price (MAP hereinafter), which has been one of the hot issues in the regulation reform debate in Japan today. The result from my research can be summarized as follows.First, a comparative account tells us that the MAP is not absolute necessity derived logically from the principles of Japanese civil execution, such as the liquidation principle, or the residual value principle. Especially the experiences disputes and institutional outcomes in the foreclosure reform in the USA in late 90s gives us a hint for another possibility of real estate liquidation for the debt collection.Second, applying a corporate finance theory to the real estate finance, we find that the MAP is only a second best solution to determine the control right over price setting of the collateral. The formal guideline for the efficient reserve price, formulated by the Auction Game theory, therefore, cannot be directly applied to the MAP.Third, a statistical analysis, using the data sets of more than 1500 cases from judicial sales recently operated in the Tokyo and Osaka District Court reveals, that the competition pressure in the collateral auction is a key element to avoid the perverse effect of the MAP.