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Reexamination on the Hypothec from the Viewpoint of Foreclosure Cost Analysis

从止赎成本分析角度重新审视抵押权

基本信息

批准号：
09620030
负责人：
MORITA Osamu
金额：
$ 1.92万
依托单位：
The University of Tokyo
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
1997
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
1997 至 1998
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-09620030/
关键词：
hypothec Law and Economics Game theory Foreclosure Execution hindrance Short Term Lease

项目摘要

We developed the game-theoretical model to analyze the hypothec from the viewpoint of foreclosure cost. Our model is based on the non-cooperative bargaining model, which is known as Rubinstein Bargaining Game. Rubinstein model was refined by American Law and Economist who had analyzed the efficiency of various mortgage foreclosure systems in the 80's. To make this model more realistic, we classified the bargaining processes under existing law into three phases ; (1) the negotiation after the due date before the foreclosure claim, (2) the negotiation in the foreclosure process, (3) the negotiation after the adjudication.In the 90's, Japanese real estate finance law suffered serious changes because of the economic up and down. The traditional theory on the hypothec, which had been established as "Value right theory" in the 20's, was considerably revised or completely abandoned to catch up with the needs of the economic activities. The Supreme Count changed the case law and created the new approach in regard of almost all the important hypothec provisions of Japanese Civil Code (JCC hereafter). These judicial measures are, however, insufficient to cope with critic situation and the legislative action is desperately needed today.We , then, tried to analyze the legislative proposition about the article 395 JCC from the viewpoint of Law and Economics. According to the Coase theorem under positive transaction cost, this provision should be abolished but some remedies or compensation can be given to the short term lessee.

我们建立了博弈论模型，从止赎成本的角度对抵押权进行了分析。我们的模型是基于非合作讨价还价模型，即鲁宾斯坦讨价还价博弈。鲁宾斯坦模型是美国法学家S在分析了80年代各种抵押贷款止赎制度的效率后提出的。为了使该模型更符合实际，我们将现行法律下的讨价还价过程分为三个阶段：(1)止赎要求到期后的谈判阶段，(2)止赎过程中的谈判阶段，(3)判决后的谈判阶段。90年代，S时期，日本房地产金融法因经济起伏而发生重大变化。传统的抵押权理论在20世纪20年代确立为S的“价值权论”，但为了适应经济活动的需要，对传统的抵押权理论进行了较大的修正或彻底抛弃。最高法院改变了判例法，并在日本民法典(以下简称JCC)几乎所有重要的抵押权条款方面开创了新的做法。然而，这些司法措施不足以应对批评的局面，迫切需要立法行动。在此基础上，我们试图从法经济学的角度对JCC第395条的立法主张进行分析。根据正交易费用下的科斯定理，这一规定应该废除，但可以对短期承租人给予一定的补救或补偿。