Comparative Study of Japanese and German Fiscal System for Welfare from Institutional Economics

本研究的目的是考察地方政府财政均等化等财政制度与最初设想的目的不同的现象。首先，我们详细考察了制度经济学中的国家作用，发现需要更多关注的不是新制度经济学，而是德国和奥地利的经济和财政理论，第二，通过对日德两国社会保险和公共救助制度形成的比较研究，发现德国的地方政府和非营利组织作为福利服务的主要提供者，由于普遍性的补助，享有财政和管理的自主权。与此相反，日本的中介组织严重依赖中央政府的特别赠款。这一区别的关键在于福利中是否存在“补贴原则”。

The purpose of this research was to investigate the phenomenon that some fiscal institutions, e.g. local government fiscal equalization, function in a different way from the purpose planned at first.First, we examined the role of the state in Institutional Economics in detail and found out that more attention should be needed, not on the Neo-Institutional Economics, but on the economic and fiscal theory in Germany and Austria, that has a long tradition from 19th century.Second, a comparative study on the formation of the institutions in social insurance and public assistance of Japan and Germany suggests that local governments and non-profit organizations, the main providers of welfare services, enjoy fiscal and managerial autonomy in Germany because of general grants. In contrast to that, those intermediary organizations in Japan strongly depend on special grants from the central government. It is crucial to this difference whether an idea "The Principle of Subsidiarity" exists in welfare.