Designing practical mechanisms for indivisible good allocation

在拍卖或匹配等不可分割好的经济中，我们研究了经济机制的设计问题。例如，在一个没有偏好准线性假设的拍卖模型中，我们在公平和策略证明的基础上提供了第二价格拍卖的（公理化）表征。进一步，我们在匹配模型中刻画了一个稳定的单侧防策略规则。我们还在分配经济中弱版本的战略证明的基础上描述了统一规则。在我们的讨论中，我们削弱了各种假设或条件，以获得实际的机制。

In indivisible good economies such as auction or matching, we studied the problem of designing economic mechanisms。For example, in an auction model without the quasi-linearity assumption on preferences, we offered an(axiomatic) characterization of second price auctions on the basis of equity and strategy-proofness。Furthermore, we characterized a rule that is stable and one-sided strategy-proof rule in a matching model。We also characterized the uniform rule on the basis of a weak version of strategy-proofness in allotment economies。In our discussions, we weakened various assumptions or conditions to obtain practical mechanisms.