Bargaining Game Theory of Strategic Coalition Formation and Incomplete Information

本研究旨在运用议价博弈论的新方法，探讨在联盟间存在外部性的情况下，联盟形成的战略层面和实现有效结果的条件。此外，我们研究了不完全信息议价问题的合作对策和非合作对策的解概念，并考虑了机制设计问题。(1)战略联盟的形成与非合作议价博弈模型：提出了一个配分函数形式博弈的非合作议价博弈模型，并考察了平稳子博弈完全均衡、纳什议价解与核心之间的关系。我们把它应用到自由贸易协定的问题上。(2)信息不完全议价问题纳什议价解的定义。(3)信息不对称下的机制设计与联盟形成。

The aim of this research is to investigate strategic aspects of coalition formations and conditions to realize the efficient outcome, by applying new methods in bargaining game theory, in the situations where there exist externalities among coalitions. Moreover, we examine the solution concepts of the cooperative and noncooperative games for the bargaining problem with incomplete information and consider the problem of mechanism design. The research consists of the following three topics:(1)Strategic coalition formation and a noncooperative bargaining game model: We present a non-cooperative bargaining game model in the partition function form game and examine the relationships between a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, Nash bargaining solutions and core. We apply it to the problem of free trade agreements. (2)Definition of Nash bargaining solution for the bargaining problem with incomplete information. (3)Mechanism design and coalition formations under asymmetric information.