Terahertz Imaging for Side-Channel Attacks

该项目旨在利用太赫兹波从集成电路中提取敏感信息，作为旁路攻击的一种手段。这一概念是基于太赫兹波对半导体中自由载流子(即电子和空穴)动力学的特殊敏感性。这一前景是由太赫兹波在非金属芯片封装中传播并提供亚毫米空间和深度分辨率的能力促成的。对带电芯片的非接触式太赫兹探测将提供原始数据，即泄漏，这些数据可以被统计工具处理，以通过密码工程推断秘密信息。本项目将对这一泄漏进行探索，以评估潜在的风险并提出有效的对策。

This project aims to employ terahertz waves to extract sensitive information from integrated circuits, as a means of side-channel attack. The concept is founded upon exceptional sensitivity of terahertz waves to the dynamics of free carriers, i.e., electrons and holes, in semiconductors. This prospect is fostered by the ability of terahertz waves to propagate through nonmetallic chip packaging and to provide sub-millimetre spatial and depth resolutions. Noncontact terahertz probing of a live chip will deliver raw data, i.e., leakage, that can be processed by statistical tools to infer secret information through cryptographic engineering. This project will explore this leakage to assess potential risks and propose effective countermeasures.