A Universalist Philosophy of Mind

哲学家们传统上区分具体事物（可计数的实体）和普遍事物（这些具体事物所共有的实体）——例如，将表格与灰色的属性进行对比。在分析传统中，精神哲学的核心假设是将精神状态（如信仰、情感）视为精神细节的概念。这一假设从未被证实过。UNIPHIMIND的目标是为普遍主义论点提供第一个完整的辩护，根据普遍主义论点，心理状态是普遍的或其实例。它将通过绘制心灵哲学的普遍主义论题的全部含义，并通过追溯采用特殊主义假设的历史，从而开辟新的基础。联菲明的总体目标是表明这些影响是深刻和广泛的。

Philosophers traditionally distinguish between particulars (entities which can be counted), and universals (entities which are the common natures in which these particulars partake) - contrast, e.g., the table with the property of being gray. The core assumption of philosophy of mind in the analytic tradition is a conception of mental states (e.g. beliefs, emotions) as mental particulars. This assumption has never been argued for. The ambition of UNIPHIMIND is to provide the first full defense of the universalist thesis, according to which mental states are universals or instantiations thereof. It will do so by drawing the full implications of the universalist thesis for philosophy of mind and by tracing the history of the adoption of the particularist assumption, thereby breaking new grounds. The overarching goal of UNIPHIMIND is to show that these implications are deep and far-ranging.