Illicit Drug Economies, Governance and Security-Development in the Global South: a Case Study of State-Narco Networks in Post-Transition Bolivia

传统的政策和学术话语认为，全球南方的非法毒品经济必然是暴力的，是体制薄弱、发展受阻和普遍不稳定的原因和结果。这一想法在国际社会对发展中国家毒品贸易的反应中占主导地位的压制性禁毒措施中得到了明显体现。然而，这些广泛的假设未能考虑到毒品经济与当地社会、政治和经济结构交织在一起的复杂方式。这些关系的性质具有广泛的影响，例如，决定毒品贸易是否与高度暴力有关；当地政治秩序和国家机构的职能；以及毒品贸易对经济增长和发展指标的影响。在许多情况下，未能把握这些潜在动态导致了破坏性的意外政策后果。因此，从政策和发展的角度来看，需要进行更加切合实际的分析，以便更好地了解全球南方非法经济、治理和安全-发展关系之间的相互作用。我的研究采用了这样的方法；超越了主流正统观念，审视了一个关键的历史案例，它仍然具有重大的当代意义：转型后的玻利维亚(1982-1993)。这种方法揭示了国家-毒品网络在玻利维亚生活的不同领域的影响。这些影响扰乱了主流毒品话语的典型预期。首先，地方贩运组织被并入现有的政治结构，以管理和调解可卡因经济的暴力行为。虽然其安第斯邻国陷入了与毒品有关的各种形式的暴力，但玻利维亚的非法贸易因此保持相对和平。其次，默许贯穿整个军队和警察部门的毒品联系，必然会维持脆弱的政治平衡。随着玻利维亚实现其长期承诺的从威权政府过渡，对这种做法的容忍确保了这些主要政治行为者继续支持民主化。从这个意义上说，非法经济与玻利维亚参差不齐的民主治理交织在一起。第三，在危机和严酷的结构性改革期间，蓬勃发展的毒品贸易帮助稳定了国民经济。古柯-可卡因经济起到了社会安全网的作用，提供了就业和外来投资，同时也支持了银行系统。对于许多玻利维亚农民来说，古柯可卡因提供了最可行的脱贫途径。综上所述，这些因素造成了对非法经济的矛盾心理，以及对“破坏稳定”的美国禁毒努力升级的抵制。这些研究结果提出了关于非法经济背景下的安全、体制建设和发展的重要问题。这些问题在玻利维亚国内仍然很突出。该国仍然是古柯可卡因的主要生产国，而且日益成为国际可卡因贸易的中转站。许多农村社区的收入仍然依赖非法经济；有组织犯罪和腐败抑制了民主机构和法治的功能，该国东部零星地爆发了毒品暴力。放眼玻利维亚之外，全球其他地方也遇到了类似(往往更严重)的问题，从墨西哥卡特尔的暴力加剧到鸦片引发的阿富汗冲突。我自己的研究谈到了这些案例，为非法经济带来的发展挑战提供了强有力的见解。分析这些进程对于制定更好的政策对策至关重要；使毒品贸易与这些国家脱钩，同时避免普遍的暴力、体制腐败和对岌岌可危的生计的损害。

Conventional policy and academic discourse holds illicit drug economies in the Global South as necessarily violent, and both a cause and consequence of weak institutions, stunted development and general instability. This thinking has been evident in the repressive counterdrug measures that have dominated the international response to the drug trade in developing nations. These broad assumptions, though, fail to account for the complex ways in which drug economies become intertwined with local social, political and economic structures. The nature of these relationships has wide implications, determining, for example: whether or not the drug trade is associated with high-levels of violence; the local political (dis)order and the function of state institutions; and the effects of the drug trade on economic growth and development indicators. In many cases, the failure to grasp these underlying dynamics has led to damaging unintended policy consequences. From both a policy and development perspective, then, a more contextualised analysis is needed to improve understanding of the interplay between illicit economies, governance and the security-development nexus in the Global South. My research adopts such an approach; moving beyond the mainstream orthodoxy to examine a crucial historical case, which continues to hold great contemporary relevance: post-transition Bolivia (1982-1993). This approach reveals the influence of state-narco networks across different spheres of Bolivian life. These effects confound the typical expectations of the mainstream discourse on drugs. First, local trafficking organisations were absorbed into existing political structures, which acted to manage and mediate the violent excesses of the coca-cocaine economy. While its Andean neighbours descended into various forms of drug-related violence, Bolivia's illicit trade thus remained relatively peaceful. Second, tacit-acceptance of drug links running through the military and police was bound to the maintenance of fragile political equilibrium. As Bolivia made its long-promised transition from authoritarian government, toleration of such practices ensured the continued support of these major political actors for democratisation. In this sense, the illicit economy was interwoven with Bolivia's uneven democratic governance. Third, the booming drug trade helped to stabilise the national economy during crisis and harsh structural reforms. The coca-cocaine economy acted as a social safety net, providing employment and inward investment, while also bolstering the banking system. For many Bolivian farmers, coca-cocaine offered the most viable route out of poverty. Taken together, these factors created ambivalence toward the illicit economy and resistance to the escalation of 'destabilising' US counterdrug efforts. These research findings raise important questions around security, institution building and development in the context of illicit economies. Such issues remain salient within Bolivia. The country continues to be a major producer of coca-cocaine and, increasingly, a transit point for the international cocaine trade. Many rural communities are still reliant on the illicit economy for their income; organised crime and corruption inhibit the function of democratic institutions and the rule of law, with sporadic outbreaks of drug violence in the east of the country. Looking beyond Bolivia, similar (often, more severe) problems are encountered elsewhere around the globe, from the heightened violence of the Mexican Cartels to the opium fuelled conflict of Afghanistan. My own research speaks to these cases, providing strong insights into the development challenges posed by illicit economies. Analysis of these processes is crucial to the formulation of better policy responses; decoupling the drug trade from these countries while avoiding widespread violence, institutional decay and damage to precarious livelihoods.