"Unpopular Policies, Electoral Spending, and Undesirable Local Fiscal Outcomes: Evidence from Romanian Austerity

我调查了中央政府实施的不受欢迎的措施是否会激励受选举驱动的地方政府将公共资金从长期投资重新分配到短期支出。利用来自罗马尼亚的选区级支出数据，我量化了一项紧缩政策的影响，该政策导致67家公立医院关闭。我发现有证据表明，在受政策影响更大的政府领域，资金从教育和基础设施投资转向了住宅、文化、娱乐和宗教支出。我发现反对党选区的再分配较弱。此外，我发现这些估计在选举竞争激烈的地区是最大的。研究结果表明，不受欢迎的地方财政再分配可能会削弱不受欢迎的国家政策（尤其是紧缩政策）的有效性。研究结果可以部分解释为什么即使在超国家机构的支持下实施这些措施，也往往无法实现其既定目标。

I investigate whether unpopular measures implemented by a central government incentivize electorally-motivated local governments to redistribute public funds from long-term investments to short-run spending. Using constituency-level expenditure data from Romania, I quantify the effects of an austerity policy by which 67 public hospitals were shut-down. I find evidence of a substitution of funds from education and infrastructure investments to residential, as well as cultural, recreational and religious expenditures in governmental areas more strongly impacted by the policy. I find weaker redistributions in opposition constituencies. Further, I find these estimates to be largest in electorally contested areas. The results suggest that undesirable local fiscal redistributions can undermine the effectiveness of unpopular national policies, particularly austerity. The findings can partially explain why such measures often fail to achieve their stated objectives even when implemented with supranational institutional support.