'Square Peg, Round Hole': Exploring the Evolutionary Relationship Between Climate Change Litigation and the Development of Legal Doctrine

本研究将探讨气候变化诉讼在普通法管辖范围内挑战法律推理的基本结构的方式。这是对Fisher， Scotford和Barritt的结论的直接回应，他们已经确定了气候变化诉讼的“破坏性”性质。因此，我认为在斯科特福德教授的指导下进行这个项目是最合适的。它特别寻求将建设性解释主义裁决理论应用于2010年至2018年英国和澳大利亚的“气候变化”判例法，以确定气候争端中出现的理论法律挑战。本研究的总体目标是促进对气候变化与法律之间相互作用的理解，这些法律包含了裁决的可塑性，而不损害其稳定性。诉讼当事人和法院经常被迫将气候变化的理由“装箱”到现有的法律框架中，导致前所未有的法律纠纷，而法律推理工具比通常可用的要少。了解这对当前和未来应对气候变化的法律影响至关重要，特别是随着法院在这一领域的作用和使用不断增加。学者们试图定义和确定气候变化诉讼的“类型学”，或者为其发展规划“未来路径”。还有大量文献考虑了法院在应对气候变化方面的作用。本研究的目的是为这一不断增长的工作体系做出贡献，并开始对一个似乎不“适合”法律推理约束的问题做出“法律意义”。德沃金的法律解释主义理论可能为法院所扮演的角色提供了一种解释，它超越了单纯的“司法自由裁量权”，既不威胁法治，也不威胁民主原则。可以说，气候变化诉讼呈现了德沃金的“硬案例”；判决结果不受法律或先例规定的案件。他断言，“民事案件中的司法裁决……“特征是，也应该是由原则而不是政策产生的”，因此可以提供一个有效的理论框架。这种方法的局限性是公认的；德沃金的工作几乎完全适用于普通法推理，这需要在博士课程中调整理论方法。人们也承认，德沃宁的理论可能不会对研究问题给出完整的答案；然而，这并不影响研究确定气候变化诉讼中裁判能力的理论限制的能力。仅对英国判例法的理论法律分析不会为本研究提供足够的资料来源。比较研究将使可供分析的新颖制度反应多样化。澳大利亚是一个有用的比较国，因为它的判例更为丰富，在其法律推理过程中大量借鉴原则，并提供了与英国更常见的行政审查程序的有趣对比。

This research will explore the ways in which climate change litigation has challenged fundamental structures of legal reasoning in common law jurisdictions. It is a direct response to the conclusions of Fisher, Scotford and Barritt, who have identified the 'disruptive' nature of climate change litigation. For this reason, I believe it is most appropriate to develop this project under the supervision of Professor Scotford. It specifically seeks to apply a constructive interpretivist theory of adjudication to 'climate change' case law in the UK and Australia from 2010 to 2018, to identify the theoretical legal challenges that arise in climate disputes. The overarching aim of this research is to facilitate an understanding of the interaction between climate change and the law that encapsulates the malleability of adjudication, without compromising its stability.Litigants and courts are frequently forced to 'box' climate change grounds into existing legal frameworks, resulting in unprecedented legal disputes, with fewer legal reasoning tools than ordinarily available. An understanding of the implications of this for both present and future legal responses to climate change is fundamental, particularly as the role and use of courts continues to increase in this space. Scholars have sought to define and identify 'typologies' of climate change litigation, or map out 'future pathways' for its development. There is also extensive literature that considers the role of courts in addressing climate change. The purpose of this research is to contribute to this growing body of work, and begin to make 'legal sense' of a problem that does not appear to 'fit' into the constraints of legal reasoning. Dworkin's theory of legal interpretivism may offer an explanation for the role played by courts, which goes beyond mere 'judicial discretion' and does not threaten either the rule of law or democratic principles. It could be argued that climate change litigation presents Dworkin's 'hard cases'; cases where the result may not be dictated by statute or precedent. His assertion that 'judicial decisions in civil cases...characteristically are and should be generated by principle not policy' could therefore offer an effective theoretical framework. Limitations of this are acknowledged; Dworkin's work applies almost exclusively to common law reasoning, which demands adaptation of the theoretical approach during the course of the PhD. It is also acknowledged that Dworkinian theory may not present complete answers to the research question; however, this does not compromise the ability of the research to identify theoretical limitations to adjudicative capacity in climate change litigation.Doctrinal legal analysis of UK case law alone would not provide sufficient sources required for this research. Comparative study will diversify the pool of novel institutional responses available for analysis. Australia is a useful comparator, as its jurisprudence is more plentiful, draws heavily upon principles in its legal reasoning processes and provides for interesting contrast to the administrative review processes more commonly seen in the UK.