Puzzles in Philanthropy

我的研究试图找出并回答慈善事业中的三个谜题。第一个涉及一种奇怪的说法，即在援助是过度贬低的情况下，不援助比援助次优更可取。目前的解决方案没有吸引力，因为它们暗示没有任何援助是真正的夸大其词，它要求所有的给予，而不仅仅是强制性的给予，都是最优的(Horton，2017：95)，或者我们是否已经产生了援助成本，决定了我们是否可以以次优的方式允许援助(McMahan，2018)。第二个谜题涉及这样一个事实，即成本效益似乎意味着我们应该暂时不提供援助。我们必须等到干预措施变得更便宜，以便我们利用现有资源变得具有成本效益(Moller，2016)。鉴于这样做可能会拯救更多的生命，为现在援助的允许性辩护必须表明，我们可以允许不那么重视未来人们的生命。我将尝试对此作一个符合我们共同的仁慈原则的描述。第三个问题是卢旺达人道主义危机引发的两难境地。当援助人员在提供必要的援助时，允许他人的错误代理，就会出现这种困境。可能发生这种情况的因素有很多，例如，分发援助时是否需要做错事，或者错事是否已经存在。我将尝试分离这些因素，以提供这个问题的各种模型。

My research attempts to identify and answer three puzzles in philanthropy. The first concerns the odd claim that, insituations in which aiding is supererogatory, it's preferable not to aid than to aid sub-optimally. Current solutions areunappealing insofar as they imply that no aid is truly supererogatory, and it requires all giving, not just obligatory giving,to be optimific (Horton, 2017: 95) or that whether we've already incurred the cost of aiding determines whether we canpermissible aid sub-optimally (McMahan, 2018). The second puzzle concerns the fact that cost-effectiveness seems toimply that we ought to refrain from aiding - for now. We must wait until interventions become cheaper for our use ofcurrent resources to become cost-effective (Moller, 2016). Given that doing so will likely save more lives, a defence ofthe permissibility of aiding now must show that we can permissibly attach less value to the lives of future people. I willattempt to sketch an account of this which is consistent with our common principles of beneficence. The third concerns adilemma inspired by the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda. This dilemma occurs when aid-workers, in providing necessaryaid, enable the wrongful agency of others. There are many factors under which this can occur, for example whether thewrong-doing was required for the distribution of aid or if the wrongdoing pre-existed. I will attempt to isolate these factorsto provide various models of this problem.