The International Balance of Power and Voting Behavior

在牛津大学，我打算研究国际权力平衡的重大转变与民主国家政治生活之间的关系，尤其是在选举结果方面。例如，该领域先前的研究表明，主要的外部冲动（例如，一个新的超级大国的崛起，或一个国家内部的制度变革）可以引起其他国家的反应，包括政权更迭。这背后的理论是，政治精英对这些冲击的反应要么是模仿（通过复制一个看似成功的模式——例如，苏联解体后的民主化浪潮，美国是唯一剩下的世界超级大国），要么是遏制和压制模仿（例如，20世纪20年代至30年代许多西方国家对布尔什维克革命威胁的反应）。我的观点是，民主国家的选民也可以提出类似的论点：这些国际冲击的影响应该从选举结果中可见。例如，我的研究旨在回答的一个问题是，我们是否可以部分解释最近西方民主国家民族主义和极端主义的激增，以及俄罗斯和中国（这两个国家都不是自由民主国家）作为超级大国的重新崛起，以及美国领导的单极全球秩序的进步终结。选民可能会在威权主义中看到一个可以效仿的成功模式（这可能解释了弗拉基米尔·普京在许多西方保守派中受欢迎的原因），从而支持极端主义和民族主义政党。另一方面，我们也有理由假设，动员起来对抗威权主义和民族主义威胁的选民会做出相反的反应。因此，外部冲击可能会导致可量化的结果，如普通选民意识形态的转变或两极分化的加剧。

At Oxford, I intend to investigate the relationship between major shifts in the international balance of power and the political life of democracies, particularly in terms of election outcomes. Previous research in this field has shown, for example, that major external impulses (e.g. the rise of a new superpower, or institutional changes within one) can cause reactions in other countries, including regime changes. The theory behind this is that political elites react to these shocks either through emulation (by reproducing a model that seems successful - e.g. the wave of democratization following the fall of the Soviet Union and the United States' being the only remaining world superpower) or through containment and repression of emulation (e.g. the reactions to the perceived threat of a Bolshevik revolution in many Western countries in the 1920-30s). My contention is that similar arguments could be made for voters in democracies: the effects of these international shocks should be visible in terms of election outcomes. For instance, one question that my research would aim to answer is whether we can partly explain the recent surge of nationalism and extremism in Western democracies with the re-emergence of Russia and China (neither of which is a liberal democracy) as superpowers and the progressive end of a unipolar, U.S.-led global order. Voters might see in authoritarianism a successful model to emulate (which might explain Vladimir Putin's popularity among many Western conservatives), and thus support extremist and nationalist parties. On the other hand, it is also reasonable to hypothesize an opposite reaction by members of the electorate who mobilize to counter the threat of authoritarianism and nationalism. Therefore, external shocks might cause quantifiable outcomes such as shifts in the average voter's ideology or an increase in polarization.