Minimal Mindreading in Great Apes and Young Children

该项目将测试双系统读心假说，该假说认为，非人类动物和婴儿的读心能力（将心理状态归因于他人）受到签名限制，这将其与年龄较大的儿童和成人所表现出的更复杂的系统区分开来。一个认知上更复杂的系统可能会处理“信念本身”，而有限的系统处理注册——类似信念的状态，因为它们不能处理关于身份的命题（这是“信念本身”所需要的）。注册类似于信念，任何一个都可以用来通过信念推理的基准测试——改变位置的错误信念任务。位置改变错误信念任务包括一个被试观看一个行为人将一个想要的物体放入两个容器中的一个。随后，行为人离开了现场，在行为人不知道而主体不知道的情况下，另一个行为人将物体的位置改变到了不同的位置。当第一个参与者返回时，主体应该指出它期望参与者在哪里查找对象。至关重要的是，主体并不一定代表行为人的命题信念。“他们相信物体隐藏在那里”)，但也可以通过追踪行动者和物体的关系来解决任务；换句话说，通过注册参与者与对象的关系。为了揭示在错误信念测试中部署了哪些系统，该测试还需要表征一个对象在另一个人的头脑中是在哪个方面表征的——一个对象需要改变身份。这个身份转换任务会把有限读心者和复杂读心者的成功表现区分开来：有限读心者会通过位置转换任务，但身份转换任务会失败；老练的读心者会通过这两项考试。根据一些作者的说法，四岁以下的儿童和非人类动物的系统有限，不能代表他人的方面代表（这需要一个复杂的系统）。据报道，猿类和幼儿通过了一个隐式的位置改变错误信念任务，在这个任务中，他们的观看行为被记录下来（代替了诸如指方向或语言表达等明确的预测），同样的眼球追踪方法也可以用于一个方面的错误信念任务。双系统假说预测，猿和儿童虽然在改变位置任务中成功，但在改变身份任务中却会失败。该项目的总体目标是测试这一假设，并进一步阐明类人猿和幼儿代表他人心理状态的方式，从而更广泛地了解他们社会认知的本质。

The project will test the two-system mindreading hypothesis which holds that the mindreading ability (attributing mental states to others) of nonhuman animals and infants is subject to signature limits which set it apart from a more sophisticated system displayed by older children and adults. A cognitively more sophisticated system may process 'beliefs as such' whilst the limited system processes registrations - belief-like states that are limited in that they cannot process propositions about identity (which is required for 'beliefs as such'). Registrations resemble beliefs and either could be used to pass the benchmark test of belief-reasoning - the change-of-location false belief task. The change-of-location false belief task consists of a subject viewing an actor put a desired object in one of two containers. Subsequently, the actor leaves the scene and, unbeknownst to actor but not the subject, another actor changes the location of the object to a different location. When the first actor returns, the subject should indicate where it expects the actor to look for the object. Crucially, the subject is not necessarily representing a propositional belief of the actor (i.e. 'they believe the object to be hidden there') but could also solve the task by tracking the relation of the actor and an object; in other words, by registering the actor's relation to the object. In order to reveal which of the systems is being deployed in a false belief test, the test needs to require representing also under which aspect is an object represented in another's mind - an object needs change identities. This change-of-identity task would tease apart the successful performance of the limited mindreaders from the sophisticated ones: a limited mindreader would pass the change-of-location task but fail the change-of-identity task; the sophisticated mindreader would pass both.According to some authors, children under the age of four and nonhuman animals have a limited system and cannot represent others' aspectual representations (which requires a sophisticated system). Given that apes and young children have been reported to pass an implicit change-of-location false belief task in which their looking behaviour was recorded (in lieu of explicit predictions such as pointing or verbalising), the same eye-tracking methodology can be used with an aspectual false belief task. The two-system hypothesis predicts that, while successful in the change-of-location task, apes and children should fail at a change-of-identity task. The overall aim of this project is to test this hypothesis and further illuminate the way great apes and young children represent the mental states of others, which in turn informs the nature of their social cognition more broadly.