Returning once and for all: contrasting the public and private prison labour systems in search of the future we want.

在过去几十年中，大多数刑事司法系统都不得不面对各种重大挑战，包括过度拥挤、高累犯率、监狱人口不断增加造成的费用不断增加以及监狱内囚犯就业率低。面对这些问题，在全球经济不断变化的情况下，一些国家决定将部分刑罚系统私有化，尽管方式不同。然而，私营企业参与刑罚制度值得关注，因为这会产生道德、社会和法律的影响。特别是，在寻求解决上述问题的过程中，国际法似乎被忽视或搁置一边。国际劳工组织1930年《强迫劳动公约》（第29号）第2条第（2）款（c）项的措辞明确规定，囚犯不应“受雇于私人、公司或协会或交由其支配”，并应由公共当局监督和控制。因此，监狱私有化和私营实体雇用囚犯显然对国际准则的适用产生了影响。然而，1926年成立的公约和建议书执行问题专家委员会（专家委员会）的任务是评估国际劳工组织成员国在法律和实践中执行国际劳工标准的情况，该委员会对《公约》第2条第2款（c）项采取了一种扩大和演变的解释。该委员会确定，已经设计和实施私营监狱劳动系统的国家只要满足进一步的要求，就可以遵守该规范：囚犯必须同意就业，就业条件必须在工资、社会保障和职业安全与健康方面接近自由劳动关系。因此，正如我在以前关于这一专题的工作中所指出的那样，各国以不同的方式模仿和实施了私营监狱劳动制度和监狱私有化模式。鉴于最近刑罚系统私有化的全球势头有所增强，有必要探讨这一举措背后的原因，以便能够对针对这些系统建立的系统进行评估。建议将研究重点放在以下国家的囚犯就业问题上：澳大利亚、新西兰、南非、阿尔及利亚、阿根廷、巴西、智利、哥伦比亚、奥地利、匈牙利、白俄罗斯、法国、德国、英格兰和威尔士、苏格兰、西班牙、美利坚合众国和加拿大。作为比较和衡量私营部门参与为囚犯提供就业的成功程度的一种手段，该项目还将考虑和分析这些国家国家雇用囚犯的工作安排。然而，在这样做时，必须铭记，虽然《公约》保护囚犯不受为私人利益而强迫劳动的影响，但它并不保护他们在为国家工作时不受剥削。虽然从阅读《公约》中可以明显看出，但在实践中，这意味着国家可以强迫囚犯劳动而不违反《公约》。由于国际劳工组织的其他成员国，例如瑞典和挪威，一直抵制私营实体大规模参与其监狱的想法，因此，其刑罚制度和康复政策的组织以及这种抵制的原因沿着值得适当考虑。这项研究将根据国际劳工组织最广泛批准的规范之一，利用专家委员会制定的要求作为指标，确定现有的结构。反过来，这将有助于对不同的制度进行分类，并有助于确定各国在采取这一做法时是否确实在努力实现现代刑罚制度的目标：囚犯改造和重新融入社会。

Over the past few decades, most criminal justice systems have had to face significant challenges ranging from overcrowding, high recidivism rates, the increasing costs of a growing prison population and the low employment rate of prisoners within prisons. Faced with these issues and in the midst of a shifting global economy, several states decided to privatise parts of their penal systems, albeit in distinct manners. Nevertheless, the involvement of private enterprises in the penal system deserves attention due to the moral, social and legal implications that arise. In particular, it seems that international law may have been ignored or side-lined in the pursuit of a solution to the abovementioned issues. The wording of Article 2(2)(c) of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Forced Labour Convention of 1930, (No. 29), makes it clear that prisoners should not be "hired to or placed at the disposal of private individuals, companies or associations" and should be supervised and controlled by a public authority. In consequence, prison privatisation and the employment of prisoners by private entities has a clear impact on the application of the international norm. Yet, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), established in 1926 and whose task is to evaluate the application in law and practice of international labour standards in ILO member states, has adopted an expansive and evolutionary interpretation of Article 2(2)(c) of the Convention. The CEACR has determined that states that have designed and implemented a system of privatised prison labour may nonetheless comply with the norm so long as further requirements are met: prisoners must consent to employment and employment conditions must approximate a free labour relationship in terms of wages, social security and occupational safety and health. States have therefore modelled and implemented their private prison labour systems and prison privatisation models in distinct manners as noted in my previous work on the topic. Given the recent increased global momentum in privatising penal systems, it is necessary to address the reasons behind such a move in order to be able to evaluate the systems erected against these. It is proposed that the research be focused on the employment of prisoners in: Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Austria, Hungary, Belarus, France, Germany, England & Wales, Scotland, Spain, United States of America and Canada. As a means of comparison and to measure the success of private involvement in the provision of employment for prisoners, the project will also consider and analyse the work arrangements of prisoners employed by the state in those same countries. Nevertheless, in doing so, it is important to bear in mind that while the Convention shields prisoners from forced labour for private benefit, it does not protect them from exploitation while working for the State. Although obvious from reading the Convention, in practice, this means that the State may force prisoners to work without infringing the Convention. As other members of the ILO such as Sweden and Norway have resisted the idea of large-scale involvement of private entities in their penitentiaries, the organisation of their penal systems and rehabilitation policies along with the reasons for such resistance deserve due consideration. This research will identify the structures in place in light of one of the most widely ratified norm of the ILO, using the requirements developed by the CEACR as indicators. In turn, this will allow the classification of the different systems and help establish whether states, in engaging in this practice, are actually working towards the objectives of modern penal systems: prisoner rehabilitation and reinsertion.