Do Trading Mechanisms Offer a More Effective Approach to Institutional Investor Engagement than the Current Reliance on Conversation-based Engagement

全面调查和分析交易机制是否为机构投资者参与提供了比目前依赖基于对话的参与更有效的方法（投资者的声音）在英国的监管制度的公司管理。目的1.有助于目前的辩论围绕机构投资者的积极性; 2.审查管理守则的有效性和它的依赖投资者的声音; 3.更清楚地了解交易机制在管理中所发挥的作用; 4.确保英国机构投资者不会失去影响被投资方环境、社会和治理政策的能力;以及5.设计和提出进一步的《守则》改革。方法文献综述这一综述将涉及对《守则》的深入分析，并批判性地评价有关其有效性和弱点的相关文献。此外，有关文献“股东积极主义”将进行评估，以总结有效的管理的重要性。此外，还将审议关于利用交易机制作为管理办法的相关文献。此外，沿着对机构投资者从事某些类型交易的文献进行研究，并探讨这种活动的潜在好处。定量研究为了准确地调查投资者的声音在多大程度上优先于使用交易机制作为管理方法，实证研究将是必要的。这将涉及创建一个数据集，其中包含有关“特定投资事件”、“特定投资者”的声音、“参与事件”和随后的文本“战略治理变化”的信息。每一个“投资事件”和“声音”事件将与“战略治理变化”（如果发生）相匹配，以评估每种参与方法的影响。例如，Marks and Spencer plc当时的首席执行官Stuart Rose决定担任董事会主席和首席执行官，这违反了英国合并守则的规定。各种机构投资者公开表示不满。这些数据将从多个来源收集，例如机构投资者根据《守则》更新要求披露的信息、《负责任投资原则》报告、S&P Capital IQ和S&P SNL。a.《守则》的限制是什么？B.《守则》的适用是否存在差距？2.《守则》是否应提倡透过投资者“声音”参与，即透过投资者“声音”参与“股东积极主义”的概念是否值得尝试？3.机构投资者对《守则》的态度对投资者“声音”的依赖程度有多深？4.机构投资者在多大程度上使用交易机制来管理资产？5.交易机制如何提供比目前依赖投资者“声音”更富有成效的管理方法？结果本项目将通过研究交易机制作为管理的替代和未得到充分重视的方法，以独特的方式为机构投资者积极主义领域的奖学金做出贡献。将详细审查《守则》的有效性，并将确定若干改革建议，以便使基于市场的投资者参与在《守则》中发挥更积极的作用，从而对环境、社会和治理政策进行更有效的监督并增强其影响力。

A comprehensive investigation and analysis of whether trading mechanisms offer a more effective approach to institutional investor engagement than the current reliance on conversation-based engagement (investor 'voice') within the UK's regulatory regime for corporate stewardship.Aims1.To contribute to the current debate surrounding institutional investor activism;2.To scrutinize the effectiveness of the Stewardship Code and its reliance on investor 'voice';3.To develop a clearer understanding of the role played by trading mechanisms in stewardship;4.To ensure that UK-based institutional investors do not lose their ability to influence the environmental, social and governance policies of investees; and5.To devise and propose further reform of the Code.MethodologyLiterature ReviewThis review will involve an in-depth analysis of the Code that will describe, summarise, and critically evaluate the relevant literature concerning its effectiveness and weaknesses. Additionally, the literature concerning 'shareholder activism' will be evaluated in order to summarise the importance of effective stewardship. Furthermore, the relevant literature on the use of trading mechanisms as an approach to stewardship will be considered. Moreover, the literature on institutional investors engaging in certain types of trading will be examined along with the potential benefits of such activity.Quantitative ResearchTo accurately investigate the extent to which investor voice is privileged over the use of trading mechanisms as an approach to stewardship, an empirical study will be necessary. This will involve the creation of a dataset containing information on 'specific investment events', 'specific investor 'voice' engagement events' and subsequent textual 'strategic governance change.' Each 'investment event' and 'voice' event will be matched to a 'strategic governance change' if one occurred, in order to assess the impact of each method of engagement. An example of such an event would be when Stuart Rose, the then CEO of Marks and Spencer plc, decided to take on the role of Chairman of the Board, as well as CEO, contrary to the provisions of the UK Combined Code. Various institutional investors publicly announced their discontent. This data will be collected from a number of sources, such as the disclosures of institutional investors under the Codes updated requirements, the Principles for Responsible Investment reports , S&P Capital IQ and S&P SNL.Research QuestionsThis project will involve the consideration of the following questions:1.To what extent has the re-formulated Code addressed the weaknesses that were highlighted in the previous iteration?a.What are the Code's limitations?b.Are there gaps in the Code's application?2.Is engagement via investor 'voice' an approach that should be promoted by the Code, i.e. is the idea of 'shareholder activism' via investor 'voice' a worthwhile endeavour?3.How deep does reliance on investor 'voice' run in the approach to the Code adopted by institutional investors?4.To what extent are trading mechanisms used by institutional investors in their approach to stewardship?5.How might trading mechanisms provide a more fruitful approach to stewardship than the current reliance on investor 'voice'?OutcomesThis project will contribute to scholarship in the area of institutional investor activism in a unique way by examining trading mechanisms as an alternative and underappreciated approach to stewardship. The effectiveness of the Code will be examined in detail and a number of proposals for reform will be defined so that market-based investor engagement plays a more active role within the Code, resulting in more effective oversight and enhanced influence concerning environmental, social and governance policies.