Kantian Propositional Attitudesand Doxastic Norms

众所周知，康德把他所宣称的为“信仰”（或“信仰”）创造空间的成就归功于其巨大的意义。最近，人们对康德的信仰概念和其他命题态度的兴趣激增。这种兴趣部分是正当的推定相关康德的doxastic理论为当代认识论。这是因为，在康德看来，信念是一种坚定的、肯定的命题态度，它不是出于认识论的原因而被接受的;它不是也不可能构成知识。因此，人们可能会认为，信念在当代关于非证据性信念的争论中是有用的。这场争论涉及信念是否可以或应该出于非真理促进和非事实基础的原因而被持有。例如，一个人可能会认为，一个癌症患者有充分的理由相信，如果这种信念增加了他们的生存机会，他们就会被治愈，即使他们的实际生存机会很小，鉴于康德的信念概念涉及一套类似的证明性规范，它可能与这类辩论有关。然而，康德的doxastic理论的当代相关性建议至今仍然是一个神学的承诺和可用的奖学金仍然主要是训诂。此外，对于康德的教义学理论，存在着相互竞争的解释性分类法[6]，因此缺乏对它们的系统比较分析。首先，大多数评论家忽视了康德的doxastic理论预先假定的先验唯心主义的承诺，例如，以“事物本身”的程度。我认为，信仰需要其对象的本体可能性，即，可能性是事物自身的关系。因此，康德的解释在我看来，似乎深深地纠缠在他的先验唯心主义中。第二，需要一种替代目前提出的分类法。大多数现有的阅读材料都把认识的充分性作为区分信念类型的主要基础。相比之下，我认为康德的要求更好地满足首先区分doxastic参考框架。这些框架是一套教义规范，并根据主体的目的类型进行区分（例如：道德与理论）。不同的参照框架允许命题态度有不同的内容（而不是类型）。也就是说，我认为接受命题态度的规范并不取决于命题态度的类型（如目前在次级文献中所建议的那样），而是取决于主体所追求的目的类型。如果我的论文是正确的，那么就需要对康德关于命题态度和教义规范的理论进行全新的解释。此外，即使现有的解释在很大程度上是正确的，它们仍然无法解释它与先验唯心主义的纠缠。但可以肯定的是，如果康德的解释要对当代的辩论有任何意义，就需要一种更为中立的“康德式”命题态度分类法。我打算发展这样一个帐户，并将其应用于当代认识论中的一些问题，如非证据性信念，同行分歧，或doxastic非理性主义。8因此，该项目有以下目标：（1）发展一个新的帐户康德的doxastic理论。（2）辩护一个康德doxastic理论，不预设强有力的承诺，先验唯心主义。（3）将康德的解释应用于当代认识论问题的选择。拟议的项目至少应该澄清康德的解释，或者至少是它的衍生物，是否确实具有当代意义。理想情况下，它将导致对信仰和其他态度的性质以及支配它们的规范的问题的有见地的新贡献

Famously, Kant attributed great significance to his proclaimed achievement of making'room for faith' (or "Belief"). There's recently been a surge in interest in Kant's notion of Belief and other propositional attitudes. This interest is partly being justified by the putative relevance of Kant's doxastic theory for contemporary epistemology. This is because Belief, for Kant, is a firmly held positive propositional attitude that is not entertained for epistemic reasons; it does not and cannot constitute knowledge.So, one might think Belief could be of use in contemporary debates about, for example,non-evidential belief.This debate concerns whether beliefs can or should be held for non-truth-promoting and non-fact-based reasons. For instance, one might think that a cancer patient has good reasons to believe that they will be cured if this belief increased their chances of survival,even though their actual chances of survival are minimal.Given that Kant's notion of belief involves an analogous set of justificatory norms, it could be relevant for debates of this kind. Yet,the suggested contemporary relevancy of Kant's doxastic theory has so far remained a conjectural promise and available scholarship is still largely exegetical. Moreover, there are competing interpretive taxonomies of Kant's doxastic theory6anda systematic comparative analysis of them is missing.My current thesis has two components. First, most commentators neglect the degree to which Kant's doxastic theory presupposes a commitment to transcendental idealism, for instance to "things in themselves". To exemplify,I think that Belief requires the noumenal possibility of its object, i.e., possibility as a relation of things in themselves. So, Kant's account seems to me quite deeply entangled in his transcendental idealism.Second, an alternative taxonomy to those currently proposed is needed. Most available readings take epistemic sufficiency as the primary basis for differentiating types of belief. By contrast, I think Kant's requirements are better met by first differentiating doxastic reference-frameworks. These frameworks are sets of doxastic norms and differentiated by the type of purpose a subject is aiming for(e.g.: moral vs theoretical). And different contents (instead of types of)of propositional attitudes are permissible for different reference-frameworks. That is, I think that the norms for entertaining a propositional attitude depend not so much on the type of propositional attitude(as currently suggested in the secondary literature) but instead on the type of purpose a subject is pursuing.If my thesis is correct,a completely new account of Kant's theory on propositional attitudes and doxastic norms is required. Moreover, even if currently available accounts turn out to be largely correct, they would still fail to account for its entanglement in transcendental idealism. But surely, if Kant's account is to carry any import for contemporary debates, a more neutral "Kantian" taxonomy of propositional attitudes is needed. I intend to develop such an account and to apply it to some problems in contemporary epistemology, such as non-evidential belief,peer disagreement, or doxastic voluntarism.8Accordingly, the project has the following aims:(1)Development of a new account of Kant's doxastic theory.(2)Defence of a Kantian doxastic theory that does not presuppose strong commitments to transcendental idealism.(3)Application of the Kantian account to a selection of contemporary issues in epistemology.The proposed project should at the very least clarify whether Kant's account, or at least a derivative of it, can indeed be of contemporary relevance. Ideally, it would result in insightful new contributions to questions about the nature of belief and other attitudes and the norms that govern them