Constitutional Politics and Anticipated Leadership Transition in Non-Democracies: Case Studies in Russia, Armenia and Belarus

如果非民主政权的宪法仅仅是装点门面，而不是真正的约束，为什么要修改宪法呢？这个项目试图检验这样一个假设，即预期的领导层过渡时期（由于宪法任期即将届满，公众骚乱的发生，或这两种因素都有）是宪法修正案在法律上限制但实际上扩大了非民主政权的独裁权力的主要解释。现有的研究试图以不同的方式回答上述问题。本项目的独特之处在于，它将具体定义“预期过渡”的子类别，然后通过考虑以下三个修正阶段，系统地对主要假设进行三方检验：(a)原因；(b)过程;(c)结果（见下图1）。这一检验将应用于三个非民主政权当代政治的案例研究：2020年普京在俄罗斯联邦的宪法修正案；萨尔基相于2015年向亚美尼亚公众提出的修正案；以及卢卡申科于2021年在白俄罗斯提出的修正案。这些案例研究中的每一个都表明，由于宪法任期即将届满（俄罗斯），公众骚乱的发生（白俄罗斯）或两者的结合（亚美尼亚）而引起的预期领导层变动。这项研究将有助于将国际和国内机构对非民主政权拟议改革的反应系统化，这些改革的政策目标是通过宪政政治帮助限制专制，并（至少）抵制专制政治权力的扩大。该项目将建立一个“危险信号”监测框架，以确定宪法修正案可能被用于扩大而不是限制权力的目的。这项研究将结合宪法和政治学方面的专业知识。

Why do non-democratic regimes amend constitutions if constitutions in such regimes constitute mere window dressing and do not really constrain? This project seeks to test the hypothesis that periods of anticipated leadership transition (arising from the impending expiry of constitutional term limits, the occurrence of public unrest, or both these factors) are the primary explanation for constitutional amendments that appear to legally limit but in fact expand autocratic power in non-democratic regimes. Existing research has sought to answer the question above in different ways. The unique feature of this project is that it will concretely define sub-categories of "anticipated transition" and then systematically apply a tripartite test to the main hypothesis by considering the following three stages of amendment: (a) cause; (b) process; and (c) outcome (see Figure 1 below). This test will be applied in three case studies from contemporary politics in non-democratic regimes: Putin's constitutional amendments in the Russian Federation in 2020; the amendments put by Sargsyan to the Armenian public in 2015; and amendments proposed by Lukashenka in Belarus in 2021. Each of these case studies exhibit anticipated leadership change arising from the impending expiry of constitutional term limits (Russia), the occurrence of public unrest (Belarus) or a combination of both (Armenia). The research will help to systematise the response of international and domestic institutions to proposed reform in non-democratic regimes with the policy objective of aiding the constraint of autocracy through constitutional politics and (at the very least) resisting the augmentation of autocratic political power. The project will establish a "red flag" monitoring framework for identifying the potential use of constitutional amendment for ends that augment rather than constrain power. The research will use a blend of expertise in constitutional law and political science.