The Politics of Deterring Unwanted Immigration in the United Kingdom

我的论文将调查英国通过实施敌对威慑政策来阻止未来寻求庇护和非正规移民的出价。将讨论三个问题。首先，移民威慑政策在减少不受欢迎的移民方面是否有效？第二，公众更喜欢哪种移民威慑政策？第三，政策制定者为什么要实施这些政策？这篇论文将弥合以前孤立的学术辩论，并利用新的方法贡献实证研究结果。在英国脱欧后的移民制度持续不确定的时候，以及对船只越境增加的普遍反弹，本论文将试图揭示移民威慑政策的基本原理。导论一章将把移民态度、民主反应和政策有效性这三个经常被误认为互不相干的领域结合起来，从而提供理论贡献。论文将由四个实证章节组成。前两章实证将致力于评估英国移民威慑政策的有效性。正如Thielmann（2003）所概述的那样，如果移民在到达之前意识到这些政策，限制主义移民政策只能阻止潜在的移民。如果未来的移民既不被告知这些政策，也不将其纳入成本效益分析，这些政策就无法达到劝阻移民的目的。第一章将评估潜在的信息提供者（援助工作者、走私网络和散居海外的成员）是否向移民提供了关于联合王国威慑政策的准确信息。在第二章中，我将确定未来的移民是否被告知英国的威慑政策，以及这种知识是否是他们选择目的地国的因果驱动因素。第三章将重新审视舆论与政策的差距。我将用一种新颖的方法测试公众偏好和移民政策之间差距的存在和程度。通过两波联合实验，我还将评估英国脱欧是否增加了公众偏好与移民政策之间的一致性。最后，第四章将致力于对2014年和2016年移民法（俗称“敌对环境政策”）之前的政策制定过程进行定性案例研究。本章的目的是评估政策制定者实施移民威慑政策的原因，并调查象征政治和种族政治在敌对环境政策建设中的作用。

My dissertation will investigate the United Kingdom's bid to deter future asylum-seeking and irregular immigration by implementing hostile deterrence policies. Three questions will be addressed. First, are immigration deterrence policies effective at curtailing unwanted immigration? Second, which immigration deterrence policies does the public prefer? Third, why do policymakers implement such policies? This dissertation will bridge previously isolated scholarly debates and contribute empirical findings using novel methods. At a time of continued uncertainty over the United Kingdom's post-Brexit immigration regime and popular backlash over the increase of boat Channel crossings, this dissertation will seek to uncover the rationale underlying immigration deterrence policies. The introductory chapter will offer a theoretical contribution by uniting three areas often mistreated as disparate: immigration attitudes, democratic responsiveness and policy effectiveness. The dissertation will then consist of four empirical chapters. The first two empirical chapters will be dedicated to assessing the effectiveness of British immigration deterrence policies. As outlined by Thielmann (2003), restrictionist immigration policies can only deter potential migrants if migrants are aware of these policies prior to arrival. If prospective migrants are neither informed of these policies nor incorporate them in a cost-benefit analysis, they are ineffective in their aim to dissuade immigration. The first chapter will assess whether accurate information on the United Kingdom's deterrence policies is made available to migrants by potential information-providers: aid workers, smuggling networks and diaspora members. In the second chapter, I will determine whether prospective migrants are informed of the United Kingdom's deterrence policies and whether that knowledge is a causal driver in their choice of destination country. The third chapter will revisit the opinion-policy gap. I will test the existence and extent of a gap between public preferences and immigration policies using a novel method. Through a two-wave conjoint experiment, I will also assess whether Brexit has increased the congruence between public preferences and immigration policies. Finally, the fourth chapter will be dedicated to a qualitative case study of the policymaking process leading up to the 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts widely known as the 'hostile environment policy'. The aim of this chapter will be to assess why policymakers implement immigration deterrence policies and investigate the role of symbolic and racial politics in the construction of the hostile environment policy.