Understanding violence in the aftermath of a popular revolution: Evidence from Burkina Faso

民众起义和革命是爆炸性的暴力事件，紧随其后的是政府倒台和社会变革。虽然起义通常被描绘为主要的暴力事件(亨廷顿，1968)，但在此之后，政治得到了重组，我们经常观察到新的暴力类型和敌对派别的出现。布基纳法索在2014年经历了一场民众革命，这导致其前总统被赶下台，并重新燃起了建立一个更民主国家的希望(Frere和Englebert，2015)。然而，革命导致了更大的不稳定，暴力行为者和事件增加。社会科学家尚未理解为什么即使人民运动成功，也会出现新的暴力和变化的动机和解释。我的项目旨在解决这一差距，利用布基纳法索最近革命的证据，了解民众起义后暴力是如何发展的以及为什么会发展。我的目的是提供可操作的证据，帮助政策制定者和利益相关者预测起义后可能出现的暴力行为。通过使用先进的量化方法(调查数据)和通过在布基纳法索进行广泛田野调查的定性访谈，我问：暴力在民众革命后是如何发展和变化的？我回答了以下三个子问题，并在我的论文中分别为每个问题写了一篇论文：[RQ1]向民众革命的过渡如何影响起义后人们对治理的期望？在第一篇论文《应对RQ1》中，我调查了民众在革命之前和革命期间的期望。通过定性访谈，我收集了关于政府是否充分满足了这些期望，或者新领导层是否被认为忽视了这些预期的细微信息，从而为新政府在政治和经济上被排除在外的群体的不满创造了空间。[RQ2]对革命结果的政治不满如何解释政治暴力的发生？在第二篇论文中，我研究了政治不满与暴力变化是如何联系在一起的(RQ2)。我计划使用现有的调查数据，如非洲气压计，来衡量政治不满，并用为我的第一篇论文和最初的调查收集的定性信息来补充信息。这项调查将使我能够收集足够详细的数据，使我能够将其与将从公共来源整理的暴力事件数据联系起来。政府试图阻止暴力蔓延的努力失败了，基于我对文件1中民众期望的洞察，我假设，根据人们对起义结果的不满程度，人们将使用不同类型的暴力来表达不满，例如，骚乱、种族间暴力或恐怖主义策略。我还认为，暴力可能会增加，因为不同的种族群体为了自卫而武装自己，因为他们不相信国家的保护。[RQ3]暴力起源于哪里，它是如何在革命后传播的--是从最有可能发生起义的城市地区，还是来自对革命结果仍有不满的被排斥的农村地区？在我的第三篇论文中，我使用暴力事件数据，探索了革命后暴力的扩散及其起源(RQ3)。我试图更好地理解，暴力是首先发生在革命起义最多的地方(在城市地区)，是由起义中最活跃的人的不满推动的，还是暴力源于农村被排除在外的民众的不满。我的发现有望为有关民众革命力量如何构建革命后政治和暴力的政策辩论提供参考，以及国内和国际组织如何控制暴力的增加。

Popular uprisings and revolutions are explosive, violent events in the wake of which governments fall and societies change. While uprisings are often portrayed as the main violent event (Huntington, 1968), afterwards, politics are reorganised, and we often observe new types of violence and the emergence of opposing factions. Burkina Faso witnessed a popular revolution in 2014, which led to its former president's ousting and renewed hope for a more democratic state (Frere and Englebert, 2015). However, the revolution has led to greater instability and an increase in violent actors and events.Social scientists have yet to understand the motivations and explanations for why new violence emerges and changes even if popular movements succeed. My project aims to address this gap, leveraging evidence from the recent revolution in Burkina Faso to understand how and why violence develops after popular uprisings. My aim is to provide actionable evidence that helps policymakers and stakeholders predict where violence may emerge following uprisings.By using both advanced quantitative methods (survey data), qualitative interviews by means of extensive fieldwork in Burkina Faso, I ask: How does violence develop and change after a popular revolution?I tackle the following three sub-questions and dedicate a paper to each in my dissertation:[RQ1] How did the transition toward a popular revolution affect expectations about governance after the uprising?In the first paper, tackling RQ1, I investigate the population's expectations before and during the revolution. Using qualitative interviews, I collect nuanced information on whether the government has adequately addressed those expectations, or whether the new leadership has been perceived to ignore these, thus creating space for grievances from the groups that the new government has politically and economically excluded.[RQ2] How does political discontent with the outcome of the revolution explain the occurrence of political violence?In the second paper, I study how political discontent and variation in violence are linked (RQ2). I plan to use existing survey data, such as the Afrobarometer, to measure political discontent, and to augment the information with qualitative information collected for my first paper as well as an original survey. The survey will allow me to gather data of sufficient detail which will enable me to link it with violent event data to be collated from public sources. The government has unsuccessfully tried to stop violence from spreading and based on my insights on the popular expectations from paper 1, I hypothesise that depending on the level of discontent with the outcome of the uprising, people will express grievances using different types of violence, e.g., rioting, interethnic violence, or terrorist tactics. I also argue that the violence may increase due to the different ethnic groups arming themselves for defence because they do not believe in the state's protection.[RQ3] Where does violence originate and how does it spread after a revolution - from urban areas where uprisings are most likely to occur, or from excluded rural areas, where discontent with revolutionary outcomes remains?In my third paper, using the violent event data, I explore the diffusion of violence and its origins after the revolution (RQ3). I seek to gain a better understanding of whether violence first occurs where the revolutionary uprising was most present (in urban areas) and if it is driven by the discontent of those most active in the uprising, or whether violence stems from the discontent of rural, excluded populations.My findings promise to inform policy debates about how the forces of a popular revolution structure post-revolutionary politics and violence, and how domestic and international organisations can manage such increases in violence.