Double moral hazard and banks' risk taking

有多篇论文与银行的冒险行为和竞争有关，但它们得出了不同的结论。Keeley (1990), Repullo（2004）和Allen and Gale（2004）关注特许经营价值，他们的研究结果是，随着银行数量的增加，它们的风险转移行为的均衡水平也会增加。随着存款市场集中度的提高，银行的盈利能力会提高，特许经营价值也会增大。他们将不愿寻求高回报但低概率的项目，因为这些冒险行为可能导致他们失去特许经营权。他们的模型的关键假设是，银行投资于具有外生收益分布的资产，风险只存在于银行本身，这意味着没有公司参与风险。

There are multiple papers related to banks' risk-taking behaviour and competition, yet they have different conclusions.Keeley (1990), Repullo (2004) and Allen and Gale (2004) focus on franchise value and their results are that as the number of banks increases, the equilibrium level of their risk-shifting behaviour will also increase. As deposit markets become more concentrated, banks will be more profitable and their franchise value will be larger. They will be reluctant to seek high return but low probability projects since those risk-taking behaviours may induce them to lose their franchise. The key assumptions of their model are that banks invest in assets with exogenous distributions of returns and the risk exists only in the banks themselves, which means no firms' participation in risk.