Optimal in-kind benefits in means-tested programs

经济情况调查计划中的最佳实物福利

• 批准号: 20K01676
• 负责人: Porapakkarm P.
• 金额: $ 2.58万
• 依托单位: National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2020-04-01 至 2024-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-20K01676/
• 关键词: in-kind transfer; home production; optimal taxation; In-kind transfer; moral hazard; Mean-tested program; Optimal taxation; Life-cycle model

We investigate whether welfare benefits should be provided in-kind or in-cash. While an in-kind transfer, if well-designed, can be attractive only to its targeted low-income beneficiaries, this argument is weakened in a means-tested welfare program since means-testing already serves as a screening tool. We examine whether we can rationalize an in-kind benefit when means-testing is already in place?We characterize the optimal allocations when a social planner does not observe individuals’ productivity and designs an allocation scheme based on individual’s self-report productivity. A common solution is that individuals reporting low productivity should have their leisure over-provided and consumption goods under-provided. Our study extends this finding in a framework where individuals derive utility from several consumption goods, some of which are produced at home, i.e., they require both time and input goods purchased from markets. Our results show that since individuals can reallocate the over-provided leisure time to home production activities, high and low productive individuals value input goods for home production differently. This allows the social planner to refine its allocation scheme to better target low productive individuals.Our on-going work shows that the implementation of this allocation involves mean-testing and a complex tax system, especially when there are more than one home-produced consumption goods. We find that in some cases the complex tax system can be, to a certain extent, simplified by using an in-kind benefit.

我们调查福利应该以实物还是以现金提供。虽然实物转移支付如果设计得当，可能只对低收入目标受益人有吸引力，但这种说法在经济状况调查福利计划中被削弱了，因为经济状况调查已经成为一种筛选工具。当经济状况调查已经到位时，我们是否可以将实物福利合理化？我们描述了社会规划者在不观察个人生产力的情况下，根据个人自我报告的生产力来设计分配方案的最优分配。一个常见的解决方案是，报告生产率低的个人应该让他们的休闲时间得到过度提供，而消费品供应不足。我们的研究在一个框架中扩展了这一发现，在这个框架中，个人从几种消费品中获得效用，其中一些是在家里生产的，也就是说，它们既需要时间，也需要从市场上购买投入品。我们的研究结果表明，由于个体可以将过剩的闲暇时间重新分配给家庭生产活动，高生产率和低生产率个体对家庭生产投入物的价值不同。这使得社会计划者能够完善其分配方案，以更好地针对低生产率个体。我们正在进行的工作表明，这种分配的实施涉及经济状况调查和复杂的税收制度，特别是当有不止一种国内生产的消费品时。我们发现，在某些情况下，复杂的税收制度可以通过使用实物福利在一定程度上得到简化。