Moral Hazard, Learning and Temporal Dependence: Dynamic Incentive Problems in Firms and Markets

激励问题在现代社会中普遍存在--它们出现在公司内部、供应商和消费者之间的互动中，以及在线市场中。这个项目考察了激励问题是如何在动态的环境中出现的，以及为了实现社会有效结果而可能使用的机制。该项目的第一部分将审查当公司引入新技术时出现的动态激励问题。这项技术的效果可能还不确定，随着时间的推移，公司和工人都会了解到它的影响。绩效指标将审查这些激励问题可能如何阻碍创新，以及公司可能使用的机制，以减轻低效。第二部分考察了超市与消费者之间的互动。超市有动机了解消费者过去的购物行为，该项目将审查消费者交易的隐私如何提高她的讨价还价地位。该项目的第三部分将审查非法在线毒品市场的运作，如丝绸之路及其后继者。尽管这些市场是非法的，由罪犯运营，买家和卖家都是匿名的，但它们似乎运行得非常好。该项目将研究这些市场如何克服严重的道德风险问题，以及执法机构可能使用的机制，以阻止非法在线交易。激励问题的分析通常涉及两类模型：道德风险(或隐藏行为)模型和隐藏信息模型。这个项目考察了动态环境中的道德风险如何导致隐藏的信息。当公司和工人正在学习不确定的技术时，或者当代理人的未来成本/收益取决于她当前的行动，而这些行动没有被委托人或第三方观察到时，可能会出现这种现象。拟议的论文涉及多种经济情况，从公司内部的激励措施到超市的定价策略。它们由一个共同的方法论主题和洞察力统一起来。代理人今天的行为会影响她的偏好和明天的回报。第三方，如委托人或消费者的未来供应商，不观察代理人的行为。这导致了一种内生的不对称信息。不对称信息可能只是潜在的，即它可能不会出现在均衡路径上，就像代理人的均衡策略是纯策略的情况一样。尽管如此，它的可能性影响着激励问题。当代理人随机化，使均衡处于混合策略中时，博弈路径上会出现信息不对称，从而产生机制设计或筛选问题。这里的新奇之处在于，类型的分布是内生的。这个项目将考察具有动态后果的隐藏行为如何加剧长期关系中的代理问题；技术的性质如何影响组织形式的选择；超市等企业之间的跨期价格竞争如何影响分配效率。分析将侧重于各方无法做出长期承诺的情况，并将依赖动态博弈理论的见解和技术，结合契约理论和机制设计的见解和技术。这个项目还有第二个组成部分，那就是受到网上非法毒品市场崛起的推动，比如丝绸之路。鉴于代理人是匿名的，也没有法律追索权，道德风险问题似乎很严重。在竞争激烈的市场中，道德风险问题如何解决？这些解决方案如何影响价格加价和价格分散的程度？可以利用道德风险来阻碍非法毒品交易吗？这一部分的研究建立在竞争市场背景下的重复博弈理论基础上。它还有一个经验部分，它建立在PI及其合作者自2013年8月以来收集的数据的基础上，访问并从暗网网站上抓取数据。

Incentive problems are pervasive in modern societies - they arise within firms, in the interaction between suppliers and consumers, and in online markets. This project examines how incentive problems arise in dynamic environments, and the mechanisms that may be used in order to achieve socially efficient outcomes. The first part of the project will examine dynamic incentive problems that arise when a firm introduces new technology. The efficacy of the technology may be uncertain, and both firm and workers will learn about its effects over time. The PIs will examine how these incentive problems may impede innovation, and the mechanisms that firms may use in order to mitigate inefficiency. A second part examines the interaction between supermarkets and their consumers. Supermarkets have an incentive to know the consumer's past shopping behavior, and the project will examine how the privacy of the consumer's transactions improves her bargaining position. The third part of the project will examine the functioning of illegal online drugs markets such as Silk Road and its successors. Despite the fact that these markets are illegal, are operated by criminals and buyers and sellers are anonymous, they appear to function exceedingly well. The project will examine how these markets overcome the severe moral hazard problems, and the mechanisms that law enforcement agencies may use in order to hinder illegal online trade. The analysis of incentive problems usually involves two dichotomous classes of model: moral hazard (or hidden action) models and hidden information models. This project examines how moral hazard in dynamic environments gives rise to hidden information. This phenomenon may arise when firm and workers are learning about an uncertain technology or when the future costs/benefits to an agent depend upon her current actions, and these actions are unobserved by the principal or by third parties. The proposed papers deal with a diversity of economic situations, from incentive provision within firms to the pricing strategies of supermarkets. They are unified by a common methodological theme and insight. The action of an agent today affects her preferences and payoffs tomorrow. Third parties, such as the principal or a future supplier to the consumer, do not observe the agent's action. This gives rise to a form of endogenous asymmetric information. Asymmetric information may only be latent, i.e. it may not arise on the equilibrium path, as is the case where the agent's equilibrium strategy is a pure strategy. Nonetheless, its possibility affects the incentive problem. When the agent randomizes, so that the equilibrium is in mixed strategies, asymmetric information arises on the path of play, giving rise to a mechanism design or screening problem. The novelty here is that the distribution of types is endogenous. This project will examine how hidden action with dynamic consequences aggravates agency problems in long-term relationships; how the nature of technology affects the choice of organizational form; how inter-temporal price competition between firms such as supermarkets affects the efficiency of allocations. The analysis will focus on situations where parties cannot make long term commitments and will rely on insights and techniques from the theory of dynamic games, combined with those from contract theory and mechanism design. This project also has a second component, that is motivated by the rise of online illegal drugs markets, such as Silk Road. Moral hazard problems would seem to be severe, given that agents are anonymous and have no legal recourse. How are moral hazard problems solved in competitive markets? How do these solutions affect price mark-ups and the extent of price dispersion? Can moral hazard be leveraged in order to hinder the illegal drugs trade? The research in this section builds on the theory of repeated games, played in the context of competitive markets. It also has an empirical component, that builds on data that is being collected by the PI and his collaborators since August 2013, accessing and scraping data from dark-net websites.