The Potential of Zero-Knowledge-Proof to the Attribution Dilemma

网络事件呈上升趋势，对国家主权构成威胁。这些网络事件的归属对于国家应对网络威胁至关重要。因此，学者们将重点放在网络攻击的归属过程和证据标准上，以证明网络攻击的来源。然而，由于只有一个法律体系建立了网络攻击的证据标准，各州仍将仅限于分享不包括网络行动和披露敏感数据的证据。因此，研究建议认为，与其设定证据标准，零知识证明方法可以解决问题。它可以让各州在不泄露敏感信息的情况下，证明网络攻击的来源，并将其归因于其他州。因此，作为第一个用零知识证据来解决这一问题的研究，它应该对国际安全领域的政策制定者、研究人员和学生有价值。

Cyber incidents are on the rise and represent a threat to states' sovereignty. The attribution of those cyber incidents is essential to state's response to cyberthreats. As a result, scholars have focused on the process of attribution and evidentiary standards for proving the provenance of cyberattacks. Nevertheless, with only a legal system establishing evidentiary standards for attributing cyberattacks, states will still be limited to sharing evidence for not comprising cyber operations and revealing sensitive data. For this reason, the research proposal suggests that rather than setting evidentiary standards, the method of zero-knowledge proofs could solve the problem in question. It could allow states to prove cyberattacks' provenance and attribute them to other states without revealing sensitive information. Being the first study to address such a question with zero-knowledge proofs, it should, therefore, be of value to policymakers, researchers, and students in the field of international security.