Rebel-civilian relations and their effects on rebel-state bargaining dynamics

该项目探讨了关于冲突复发和叛军国家谈判的文献的新贡献，将叛军治理机构和叛军领导的政治动员作为可减轻冲突复发风险的变量。以前的研究在考察叛军治理对叛军国家谈判和冲突解决的影响时，得出了相互矛盾的结果。我认为，造成这种差异的一个潜在原因是，这些研究没有注意到叛军治理机构或叛军领导的运动或政党内的平民参与程度。我的论点基于民主和平理论和观众成本理论的概念，我认为，采用参与式叛军-平民关系的叛军提供了更可靠的民意支持和解决信息，因此可以更容易地与国家进行谈判，谈判发生后冲突复发率较低。

This project explores a novel contribution to the literature on conflict recurrence and rebel-state bargaining, by looking into rebel governance institutions and rebel-led political mobilization as variables that could mitigate the risk of conflict recurrence. Previous research has produced contradictory results when looking at the effects of rebel governance on rebel-state negotiations and conflict resolution. I posit that a potential reason for this discrepancy is the fact that these studies did not pay attention to the level of civilian participation within rebel governance institutions or within a rebel-led movement or political party. Basing my argument on concepts from the democratic peace theory and the audience costs theory, I argue that rebels employing participatory forms of rebel-civilian relations provide more reliable information on popular support and resolve, therefore can more easily establish negotiations with the state, with a lower rate of conflict recurrence after the negotiations happen.