Philosophy of rights, moral philosophy, and the philosophy of harm.

本文将关注的是死者是否拥有权利。一方面，人们直观地认为，权利是为活着的人保留的。看起来奇怪的是，一个已经过世、不会受到实质性影响的人，仍然可以拥有权利。例如，人权学说只赋予活着的人权利，从而强化了这一点。然而，我们经常谈到对死者负有的义务，并认为如果我们违反这些义务，我们就会冤枉死者。我们把临终前的许诺和死者的遗嘱视为至高无上的重要性。我会争辩说，遗嘱权利是存在的。这有可能极大地改变我们处理身体的方式--关于死后尊重的仪式、传统和礼拜仪式，以及死亡过程本身。

This thesis will concern whether the dead hold rights. On the one hand, it is intuitive that rights are reserved for the living. It seems odd that someone who has passed, and cannot be materially affected, can nonetheless hold rights. And human rights doctrines, for example, reinforce this by conferring rights only on the living. Yet, we often speak of duties owed to the dead, and feel we would wrong the dead were we to violate those duties. We regard deathbed promises and the wills of the deceased with paramount importance. I will argue that posthumous rights exist. This has the potential to drastically alter the way in which we deal with dead bodies-with the rituals, traditions, and liturgy regarding posthumous respect, and the death process itself.