Empirical Analysis of Contracts in Venture Financing

风险融资合同的实证分析

• 批准号: 15530230
• 负责人: YOTSUZUKA Thmoko
• 金额: $ 1.09万
• 依托单位: Otemon Gakuin University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2003
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2003 至 2004
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-15530230/
• 关键词: moral hazard; contract theory; cash-flow rights; Control rights; class-voting stock; staged financing; strategic ambiguity; ベンチャー・キャピタル; エージェンシー問題

Observed characteristics among venture finance in Japan are different from those in Silicon Valley. We empirically investigate those characteristics and difficulties with frequently used framework of "contract theory". The theory suggests that in the presence of two fold principal-agent relations in between - "entrepreneur and venture capital" and "venture capital and end-investors" -, incentive machanisms have to be designed to make the financing process efficientWe mainly investigate how financial contracting theory meets the real contracting in Japan

日本风险金融的观察特征与硅谷不同。我们以常用的“契约论”框架来实证考察这些特点和难点。该理论认为，在“企业家与风险投资”和“风险投资与最终投资者”之间存在双重委托代理关系的情况下，必须设计激励机制以提高融资过程的效率。我们主要研究金融契约理论如何与日本的现实契约相结合。