Incentive Effects of Supplemental Security Income (SSI)

描述（由申请人提供）：我们建议研究激励效应 老年人的补充保障收入（SSI）计划 在获得计划资格前不久的几年内的努力和储蓄活动 65岁。我们的研究计划的长期目标是双重的。的 第一是大幅增加对SSI影响的了解， 老年贫困者和准贫困者的工作和储蓄行为 健康与退休研究（HRS）和当前人口调查 （CPS）-提供重要的优势，并能够更丰富地描述 SSI的影响比我们使用收入调查数据获得的影响大， 计划参与（SIPP）。二是探讨使用模式 SSI和社会保障提前退休（SSER）计划。关于 后一个目标，这些程序之间的相互作用，包括效果 一个项目的设计对参与的可取性 其他的，特别感兴趣。 为实现这些长期目标，将开展四个具体项目， 贯彻第一个检验了我们早期发现的可靠性， 使用替代数据源扩展了我们之前的分析，测试了 假设未来可能的SSI接受者工作和储蓄较少时，SSI是 更慷慨。第二部分使用HRS的纵向框架来研究 个人工作努力和储蓄的实际时间模式， 利用纵向框架解决其他计量经济学问题。的 第三，丰富了我们以前的方法，通过建模的联合 确定可能的未来参与者的工作努力和储蓄行为 因为他们接近SSI的资格年龄。第四个认识到，SSER 福利可能是接近65岁的个人的重要经济来源 谁计划参加SSI，因此测试的假设，可能 未来的SSI受助人往往能够减少他们的工作努力，因为 SSER程序。本项目还研究了SSI政策是否鼓励SSER的使用 通过取消社会保障中提前退休的精算减少， 这是通常伴随着SSER的好处。这种情况发生在老年穷人身上， SSI确定了他们的净政府老年转移边际。

DESCRIPTION (provided by applicant): We propose to study the incentive effects of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program for the aged on their work effort and saving activity in the years shortly before the program eligibility age of 65. The long-term objectives of our research plan are two-fold. The first is to substantially increase knowledge about the impacts of SSI on the work and saving behavior of the elderly poor and near-poor by utilizing data sources-the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS)-that offer important advantages and enable a richer description of the effects of SSI than we have obtained using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The second is to explore the patterns of use of the SSI and Social Security Early Retirement (SSER) programs. With regard to the latter objective, interactions between these programs, including the effect that the design of one program has on the desirability of participation in the other, are of particular interest. Four specific projects aimed at achieving these long-term objectives will be carried out. The first examines the robustness of our earlier findings and extends our previous analysis using alternative data sources, testing the hypotheses that likely future SSI recipients work and save less when SSI is more generous. The second uses the HRS's longitudinal framework to examine the actual time patterns of the work effort and saving of individuals, and to address other econometric issues exploiting the longitudinal framework. The third enriches our previous methodological approach by modeling the joint determination of work effort and savings behavior of likely future participants as they approach the eligibility age for SSI. The fourth recognizes that SSER benefits may be an important financial resource for individuals nearing age 65 who plan to participate in SSI, and therefore tests the hypothesis that likely future SSI recipients are often able to reduce their work effort because of the SSER program. This project also examines whether SSI policy encourages SSER use by nullifying the early retirement actuarial reduction in the Social Security benefit that normally accompanies SSER. This occurs for the elderly poor when SSI determines their net government old age transfer at the margin.